Transcript [00:00] Millions of people around the world see [00:02] televised version of October 7 for the [00:05] first time when they watched episode [00:06] seven and 8 of the last season season of [00:09] FA. [00:09] >> Yeah. [00:10] >> And that is a wholesale failure of the [00:13] state of Israel in getting its message [00:15] out. We have to remember [00:18] in his handwritten notes, action item [00:21] number one in his commander directive to [00:25] the NBA units and to isad Kasam was this [00:30] has to be gruesome and it has to be [00:32] televised live. He was very aware and [00:36] that is why Nba operatives were equipped [00:39] with GoPros. That is why they were [00:41] filming. That is why they were live [00:43] streaming from phones of victims that as [00:47] they were executing them, they they live [00:49] streamed it in many cases and that is [00:51] why they documented it themselves [00:53] because they understood the power of [00:56] getting that message out. [01:03] Three years [music] ago, on Saturday [01:05] morning, October 7th, Israel woke up to [01:07] a nightmare. came the [music] deadliest [01:09] day for Jews since the Holocaust. The [01:12] beginning of a war that would be fought [01:14] on two fronts. [music] On the ground in [01:16] Gaza and across television screens, [01:18] campuses, and social media feeds [music] [01:21] around the world. 3 years later, the [01:23] battle over Israel isn't only about what [01:26] happened. It's about who gets to define [01:28] what [music] happened and what the world [01:31] chooses to believe. Welcome to East to [01:33] West from the Jerusalem Center for [01:35] Security and Foreign [music] Affairs. [01:37] I'm Sarah Martinez Amir and my guest [01:39] today has spent the last three years on [01:42] the front lines of that [music] battle. [01:44] Lieutenant Colonel in the reserves [01:45] Jonathan Kenriquez is a former IDF [01:47] international spokesperson and now a [01:50] senior fellow at the Foundation for [01:51] Defense of Democracies. He returned to [01:54] uniform on October 7th and has since [01:56] faced some of the toughest interviews [01:59] and fiercest scrutiny of Israel on the [02:02] international stage. Jonathan, welcome [02:04] and thank you for joining me today. [02:06] Thanks for having me. [02:07] >> So, take me back to October 7th. Where [02:11] were you and and when did you know you [02:13] were going back in? [02:14] >> I was at home, surprised like everybody [02:17] else. When I ran down to the bomb [02:20] shelter in the apartment we lived in, my [02:23] first thoughts went to the north. I [02:26] thought was attacking and I was very [02:32] aware of's capabilities. is the plans [02:36] that they had to conquer the Galile, the [02:38] capabilities of the Radwan forces and [02:41] what that probably would mean for [02:42] Israel. And I was deeply concerned with [02:46] what was happening. I was surprised when [02:49] I saw the first clips of Hamas death [02:53] squads inside Stro and that's when I [02:56] understood that we're going to war. when [02:58] I saw that Hamas had penetrated into [03:00] Israel when they had the that they had [03:02] the audacity [03:04] and the cruelty to do what they did um [03:07] of course at 6:40 6:45 [03:10] nobody had an idea of how horrible the [03:13] day was going to be but from my [03:15] perception that early in the morning by [03:18] them invading into Israel and massacring [03:22] Israelis in Israeli cities for me that [03:25] meant we're going to war and my first [03:26] question to my was, "Do you remember [03:29] where my uniform is because I'm going to [03:31] need it." [03:33] >> It's interesting that you mentioned uh [03:35] your your awareness to the northern [03:37] front, Hezbollah, which did in fact [03:40] start attacking Israel on October 8th, [03:41] but that front of the war was largely [03:45] overshadowed uh by the war in Gaza. Um [03:48] we'll get to that later, but tell me [03:50] about what you initially thought you [03:53] were going back to. um I I guess on [03:55] October 7th um as opposed to what the [03:59] reality ended up becoming um putting on [04:01] your uniform to go back to the [04:03] traditional uh spokesperson's uh unit. [04:07] But that job ended up taking you to a [04:09] whole other dimension. [04:11] >> Yeah, I mean we we were launched into a [04:14] war that we were definitely not prepared [04:16] for. the IDF on the ground, Israeli [04:19] population in southern Israel, the state [04:21] of Israel [04:23] and I would say the IDF spokesperson [04:25] unit as well. All different entities in [04:28] Israel were totally unprepared for the [04:31] reality that we uh were now thrust into [04:34] and uh took some time to responding to. [04:38] By the end of the the of October 7, the [04:41] end of the day, I tweeted that remember [04:45] how this started. It started with an [04:47] unprovoked attack by an Iranian proxy [04:50] against Israel. It will end with an [04:52] Israeli victory. In the beginning, we [04:54] will have international sympathy, but [04:57] along the way, we will be blamed for our [04:59] victory. And that pretty much still, I [05:02] think, accurately sums up where we are. [05:05] We are winning. We haven't won yet. And [05:08] I think security-wise, we're in a much [05:10] better situation than what we were on [05:13] October 7. I think we are more aware of [05:16] the realities around us. We have we're [05:18] awake and we're smelling the coffee and [05:21] we're listening to what people on the [05:23] other side are saying. We are today, I [05:26] think, less prone to [05:29] fool ourselves and self-illusion about [05:32] what really is going on and what the [05:34] intentions and capabilities are on the [05:36] other side. That's a welcome thing. But [05:39] where I think we are [05:42] where we haven't yet even started [05:45] fighting in earnest is when it comes to [05:49] international diplomacy and what some [05:52] refer to as the aid front. Many people [05:55] refer to it. Very few do anything about [05:57] it and really address it as a front or a [06:00] dimension where we fight. And I think if [06:02] anything what we've seen is that the [06:04] physical battlefield of October 7, the [06:07] Gaza Strip with Hamas, Lebanon, [06:11] Syria, with Iranian proxies and the [06:14] former Syrian regime. They were all very [06:17] threatening physically. We've dealt more [06:20] or less with all three of those. Varying [06:22] levels of success, not finished business [06:25] everywhere, but a much better security [06:27] situation than before. But what we've [06:29] seen is that the the the the battlefield [06:32] has shifted and where we're better off [06:36] security speaking, we are sadly worse [06:39] off diplomatically and politically [06:41] speaking in the west and I think that is [06:44] where the main frontier is right now. It [06:47] is lawfare against the state of Israel. [06:50] It is the possible coming of uh [06:54] draconian sanctions against Israel, [06:56] against Israeli individuals, companies, [06:59] corporations, [07:00] financial institutions, etc. And I am [07:04] concerned about it because it doesn't [07:07] seem as if the state of Israel has [07:11] undergone s sufficient [07:16] wakeup in understanding that this is [07:18] where we need to be fighting and this is [07:19] where Israel needs to invest invest time [07:22] and money and personnel and priorities. [07:26] And to that specific point, where do you [07:28] think in your eyes Israel failed on [07:31] October 8th? [07:32] >> Well, various things. I think the first [07:35] thing we um I think the mil the military [07:40] and political leadership failed to [07:46] adequately you know have the [07:48] metaphorical uh few glasses of cold [07:51] water and to make cold strategic [07:54] decisions that would serve Israel long [07:58] term. I called for and I think it was a [08:01] miss that we didn't do that for an [08:04] entity to be formed, a task force to be [08:06] formed to focus on counting [08:10] dead people killed in Gaza to [08:13] distinguish between combatants and [08:14] non-combatants. Why do I think that was [08:17] so important? Because I felt that Hamas [08:20] would this was the strategic ambush that [08:24] Hamas planned for Israel. They wanted to [08:26] attack Israel knowing that they can't [08:28] defeat Israel. they cannot defeat Israel [08:31] militarily, but they wanted to set into [08:33] motion a chain of events which would [08:35] lead Israel to then invade into Gaza and [08:38] get bogged down in urban warfare and [08:41] where Hamas would eventually use [08:44] international pressure and media warfare [08:46] against Israel to force Israel to stop [08:49] fighting while Hamas still has [08:52] Israeli hostages and while they can [08:55] dictate the outcome of the war. Their [08:57] battle plan was pretty good. Um they [09:00] were surprised by US elections in uh in [09:04] 24 and by the person who was elected and [09:07] at the end of the day that was very [09:10] consequential. I think had US elections [09:12] been different then I think their battle [09:15] plan would have worked and we would have [09:17] found ourselves in a position with [09:19] Israeli hostages in Hamas tunnels and [09:22] them dictating the end of the fighting [09:24] for us on their terms and not the other [09:26] way around. The part of Hamas's strategy [09:30] leans heavy on international [09:33] media, on the UN environment and the [09:37] non-governmental organizations that are [09:39] part of the UN universe and on um [09:43] different parts of the political [09:45] establishments in the in the US and in [09:48] Europe and that are hostile or [09:50] adversarial towards Israel. Hamas [09:53] planned on them being the economic, [09:58] financial, [09:59] political, diplomatic pressure on [10:02] Israel. And they weren't wrong. We saw [10:05] that Israel faced sanctions and boycots [10:09] and weapons embargo as we were fighting [10:13] from all of our European and American [10:16] allies. As Israelis were held captive in [10:21] Hamas dungeons, we were being told where [10:24] we could and where we couldn't fight. [10:26] One reason was that Hamas much better [10:29] than Israel framed the event and started [10:33] counting dead Gazans from the first [10:37] moment while Israel wasn't. And [10:40] unfortunately, this narrative is still [10:42] something that we face today. The whole [10:45] genocide lie, the hoax, the fallacy of [10:49] so-called genocide in Gaza relies on [10:52] kamas figures, relies on kamas data. And [10:55] it has been allowed to become such a [10:58] potent and world engulfing [11:01] truth. If you're not Israeli, if you [11:04] live in Western Europe or in the US, [11:07] most likely according to cos polls, you [11:10] believe today that there was and still [11:13] is a genocide in Gaza. It is of course [11:15] totally false and detached from reality [11:17] and is absolutely baseless, but 70 plus [11:21] thousand people allegedly killed in Gaza [11:25] as per Hamas. They allegedly tell that [11:28] story. Now, since there isn't an Israeli [11:31] narrative or Israeli data information [11:35] that confronts or undermines Kamas's [11:38] narrative, they're left on an empty [11:40] playing field. And that's something that [11:42] I think Israel should have and could [11:44] have prevented early on in the war by a [11:46] task force designated by the prime [11:48] minister or sanctioned by the prime [11:50] minister. all of the different defense [11:52] establishments, Kogat, um the different [11:56] parts of Israeli Intel, Southern [11:58] Command, Shabbach, they should have been [12:00] in a task force together with a purpose [12:02] of counting and sifting through [12:05] information and telling who was a [12:07] combatant and who wasn't and to poke the [12:10] very easy, you know, lies, poke through [12:12] the lies of of Hamas's propaganda and to [12:15] challenge that entire fallacy which [12:18] today is known as the the genocide. The [12:21] second issue where I think we failed [12:23] strategically early on was to recognize [12:26] that Gaza with about 2 million people in [12:31] it in a densely populated urban terrain [12:34] with a layer underneath it which is [12:37] unprecedented in its complexity, [12:40] diversity and [12:43] skill and and tactical preparedness. the [12:45] tunnel system that Kamas built having [12:49] trying to fight there maneuver warfare [12:52] densely populated urban area with our [12:56] hostages below ground which [12:58] significantly [13:00] uh limited what the IDF could do in [13:03] terms of the use of force above and [13:05] below ground and with two roughly 2 [13:08] million civilians in Gaza that's a an [13:13] exercise in almost impossibility. You [13:17] cannot defeat a terrorist enemy that [13:20] relies on civilians as their human [13:22] shields and has our civilians as hostage [13:25] beneath and also heavily entrenched in [13:28] tunnels in a densely populated urban [13:31] area. It it isn't possible. I think the [13:33] IDF did very well with the [13:37] >> given the circumstances [13:37] >> given the circumstances. What Israel [13:39] should have done strategically and this [13:41] is at the government level. Israel [13:44] should have first and foremost gotten [13:46] civilians out of Gaza. And the civilian [13:48] population in Gaza is the cannon foder [13:51] and the human shield that Hamas needs in [13:55] order to apply pressure on Israel. Since [13:58] we didn't get them out of the way, [14:00] either through Egypt, which was option [14:02] one, and or to build a humanitarian zone [14:06] inside Israel and get the civilian [14:08] population in Gaza out of the combat [14:11] area. Those were basically the two [14:13] options. Since we didn't do that, we [14:17] played into Kamas's hands and uh and [14:20] Kamas was able to strategically benefit [14:22] from that. And it it feed it fed very [14:26] much into the whole battle of the [14:28] narratives when it comes to civilian [14:30] suffering. And that is what we face [14:32] today. That is what all of our [14:35] adversaries and enemies are using as a [14:38] pretext. That is what we face at the IC [14:41] in the ICJ. That is what many European [14:43] countries including the UK and France [14:45] with new sanctions against Israel. And [14:47] that is what many Democrats in the US [14:50] are using as their uh foundation for [14:53] allegations against Israel. That could [14:56] have been prevented if Israel had better [15:01] leadership and better decision-making [15:03] capabilities in the beginning. And it's [15:06] so regrettable because on the moral side [15:08] of it, Israel has done everything [15:12] humanly possible to minimize the effect [15:14] on the civilian population. Never before [15:17] in warfare has two parties have two [15:20] parties fought and one party was forced [15:23] and actually agreed to provide water, [15:27] food, electricity, fuel and other very [15:32] valuable commodities to its enemy while [15:36] the enemy was fighting. Never before. I [15:38] haven't found a single example in human [15:41] history genocide uh where that that's [15:43] that's the case. [15:44] >> Yeah. And you know, we we knowingly were [15:47] forced to provide our enemy with fuel [15:50] [clears throat] as they were fighting [15:52] us. [15:53] >> When you're talking about the um the [15:55] battle for the narrative um and [15:58] specifically how Hamas was able to [16:00] portray itself as as the victim in this [16:02] situation. Um, I recently spoke to a an [16:06] American student um who was a former uh [16:10] pro Palestinian uh turned pro-Israel and [16:13] she said something very interesting was [16:15] the fact that on October 7th, the way [16:17] that this was portrayed was a um it was [16:22] portrayed as as an attack on on [16:24] soldiers. It was an attack on on [16:27] military bases and there was absolutely [16:29] no um information out there or or [16:32] footage um that was readily available to [16:35] the media to to students on social media [16:38] of the attacks that took place on [16:40] civilians on the Nova Music Festival. [16:43] >> Do you think that Israel made a mistake [16:46] by not making that footage, as gruesome [16:48] as it was, more available to the public [16:52] outside of Israel? And I know that this [16:53] was a a a very tough um spot because [16:57] given Israel as we know it, it's a very [16:59] small country. Um and everybody knows [17:02] each other in a way and it was very easy [17:04] to to fall into that trap of not wanting [17:07] to harm the families of the victims. [17:10] Yeah. But at the same time, that [17:12] footage, as horrific as it was, I I [17:15] think would have been so essential in in [17:18] gaining more um support on the [17:22] international field. [17:23] >> Yeah. You know, many millions of people [17:25] around the world see a televised version [17:30] of October 7 for the first time when [17:32] they watched episode seven and 8 of the [17:34] last season season of [17:35] >> FA. Yeah. And that is a wholesale [17:38] failure of the state of Israel in [17:40] getting its message out. And you know we [17:44] we have to remember [17:47] in his handwritten notes action item [17:50] number one in his commander directive to [17:54] the NBA units and to isadin Kasam was [17:59] this has to be gruesome and it has to be [18:02] televised live and people around the [18:06] world our Palestinian brothers in what [18:09] they call the West Bank in Judea and [18:11] Samaria [18:12] and Arabs in Israel and Arabs all around [18:15] the world must see it live because we [18:18] want to ignite the flood of Alexa. He [18:21] was very aware and that is why Nba [18:23] operatives were equipped with GoPros. [18:26] That is why they were filming. That is [18:28] why they were live streaming from phones [18:30] of victims that as they were executing [18:34] them they they live streamed it in many [18:36] cases and that is why they documented it [18:39] themselves because they understood the [18:40] power of getting that message out. I [18:43] give credit to the people in the IDF [18:46] spokesperson unit who thought of you [18:49] know collecting all of the the the [18:51] footage pretty quickly whether it was [18:54] from Tesla vehicles and other [18:57] cam, you know, cameras on on in [19:00] vehicles, but also of course from the [19:02] GoPros of the terrorists themselves and [19:04] other sources, security cameras, and [19:06] compiling a 45minute [19:09] movie uh of uh of some of the [19:12] atrocities, of course, not all of the [19:14] atrocities. I've watched the movie [19:17] several times, shown it to many [19:20] important and distinguished people from [19:22] around the world when they came to [19:24] visit. And very early on I said and I [19:27] continued to say and I repeated and [19:30] asked and recommended and suggested and [19:33] demanded that Israel release the movie [19:36] for public consumption on a dedicated [19:38] website after the necessary steps uh [19:42] were taken to obscure the identities of [19:45] people as necessary in order to protect [19:49] their privacy in order to make it [19:51] palatable for the families. is um but [19:55] that the strategic importance of getting [19:58] the truth out was so important. Um and [20:01] and unfortunately that wasn't uh that [20:04] wasn't done and I think that is a [20:06] strategic shortcoming. the fact that so [20:08] many people around the world, especially [20:10] Arabs, but also a lot of Westerners, [20:13] are able to [20:16] claim that Hamas's targets were military [20:21] and that most of the civilians murdered [20:24] on October 7 were killed um erroneously [20:28] by the IDF as part of the so-called [20:31] Hannibal [20:33] directive is of course a tremendous lie. [20:36] But um Israel I think hasn't done enough [20:40] in order to refute those lies and uh we [20:42] should have done that early on. I think [20:44] it was correct to showcase it first to [20:48] select and very important audiences [20:50] diplomats heads of state editors [20:53] journalists etc. But after a month or [20:56] two, that should have been public [20:58] knowledge. It could have been should [21:00] have been out there in the open. And [21:01] Israel should have made significant [21:04] efforts to push that everywhere. [21:07] Billboards, social media, parliaments, [21:11] and of course everywhere on regular TV. [21:14] This should have been a massive campaign [21:16] by Israel. And I think um Hamas Abu [21:20] Oeda, the late media mastermind of Hamas [21:23] and a great communicator and really [21:27] strategic communications professional, I [21:30] think he um took a sigh of relief and [21:32] was very happy that we did that mistake [21:34] and didn't publish it. Speaking of [21:37] movies, which you you uh touched on a [21:40] little bit before, uh the movie Naza, uh [21:42] which alleges that the IDF uses AI in [21:46] order to uh um carry out strikes in [21:49] Gaza, uh which has led to um [21:53] large civilian casualties. I want to get [21:55] your reaction uh to those allegations, [21:58] to the film itself. [21:59] >> I haven't seen the movie in its entirety [22:01] yet. I've seen parts of it and I've [22:04] looked through a lot of the interviews [22:06] of the two makers of the movie. These [22:09] two political activists call themselves [22:12] journalists, but they are political [22:14] activists with a very political goal, [22:17] clear political goal against Israel. Um, [22:20] and I'd say that what NAZA tries to do [22:23] is to portray the entire Israeli society [22:26] as an a cruel, indifferent, [22:31] uh, brutal, genocidal society that has [22:34] no regard for killing civilians in [22:39] combat. Um and uh they of course show a [22:44] very very manipulative [22:47] and untruthful u story [22:52] rel relating to the targeting practices [22:55] of uh of the IDF. Um I think when the [23:00] movie will be accessible I'll be able to [23:02] uh analyze it deeper. The IDF [23:06] issued a statement many many days about [23:09] a month after the movie was released [23:11] which was which is detailed which speaks [23:13] about the falsification which speaks [23:16] about how um how wrong the the narrative [23:22] is and it's ironic you know the very [23:25] name Naza means agave Hebrew for [23:28] collateral damage which is the [23:31] restrictions that the IDF [23:34] takes upon itself when targeting in Gaza [23:38] in order to minimize collateral damage. [23:41] When an Israeli when an IDF operator [23:43] hears the word Naza, it means okay, you [23:46] need to be careful and you need to apply [23:49] the the basics of international [23:52] humanitarian law, distinction, [23:54] proportionality, and the adequate level [23:57] of lethality so that you can achieve a [24:00] military objective while minimizing the [24:03] collateral damage, the NAZA. So, it's a [24:05] bit absurd that this is the name that [24:07] they chose. I think they chose it [24:09] because it it sounds strong. There's a [24:12] phonetic resemblance to Nazi and I think [24:16] that is [24:17] >> play on words that was very [24:19] >> very intell very very that was intended. [24:22] I think that it would have been better [24:23] if they would have focused on actually [24:26] preventing the movie from being screened [24:29] or being ready to face the contents of [24:32] the movie as it was being screened. And [24:35] I think that's what official Israel [24:36] should have been busy with. Whether it's [24:38] the ministry of education, the ministry [24:40] of foreign affairs, the prime minister's [24:42] office, the IDF, foreign ministry, all [24:45] of them. I mean, the movie was announced [24:48] in July uh in Venice and the official [24:52] Israel had enough time to um understand [24:56] what was in the movie and to prepare [24:58] accordingly. One of the reasons why it [25:01] was so infuriating here in Israel and [25:03] why it created such a buzz was that [25:06] again the other side, Hamas, its [25:09] supporters, the two makers of the movie [25:11] and the European money that founded it, [25:15] they were playing on an empty empty [25:16] field. Again, official Israel was uh [25:20] busy preparing for Shana instead of [25:23] engaging in narrative warfare and having [25:27] prepared itself against it. And there's [25:29] a lot that could and should have been [25:31] done instead of silly statements [25:33] afterwards. And when you look at and [25:34] this has been said by British officers, [25:37] by American officers who have had the [25:39] opportunity, they've had access in while [25:43] is IDF was targeting in Gaza and in [25:46] Lebanon. They've seen the procedures [25:48] that we undergo. They have seen what [25:50] restrictions we apply on ourselves in [25:53] terms of diverting ordinance in real [25:55] time in terms of monitoring the area to [25:58] try to minimize the presence of [26:01] non-combatants in terms of early warning [26:04] and uh calling ahead whenever the [26:07] tactical situation permits and making [26:10] sure that non-combatants have time to [26:12] evacuate from a premise before it is [26:15] struck. using small ordinance, what we [26:17] refer to as roof knocking, dropping [26:20] leaflets in order to warn people in an [26:23] area that this is now going to be a [26:24] combat zone and you better leave if you [26:27] want to be safe. Israel has done above [26:29] and beyond and American and British [26:32] officers have said our problem is that [26:34] you do too much. we won't be able to and [26:37] we don't have any intention of applying [26:40] the same standards and the same [26:42] restrictions on ourselves in the next uh [26:45] urban warfare that we will find [26:47] ourselves in. And you know this it's [26:49] very easy to see the results wise when [26:51] you look at casualty figures and when [26:54] you look at the amount of non-combatants [26:57] that most likely were killed in Gaza [27:01] during the war. Israel was able to [27:03] achieve around a ratio of between 1.2 to [27:08] 1.5 non-combatants killed for every [27:12] combatant killed. As horrible as that is [27:15] a person getting killed who wasn't part [27:18] of the fighting, it is about 10 times [27:21] better than the global benchmark. And [27:24] when you compare it to the situation in [27:27] Iraq and Afghanistan and most other [27:30] places where Western forces fought [27:32] terrorist enemies, terrorist armies that [27:34] were entrenched in in urban terrain, [27:38] they did far worse than what we did. [27:40] Why? We used the same weapons. We used [27:43] the same airplanes. We have the same [27:45] ordinance. We care more about minimizing [27:48] collateral damage, NAZA, and we held [27:51] ourselves to higher standards. So [27:53] therefore, I think it's perverse. It's a [27:55] perversion of truth. It's absurd to to [27:58] allege that Israel not only doesn't take [28:01] extraordinary measures to minimize [28:03] collateral damage, but to imply that [28:05] Israel knowingly kills civilians and is [28:08] in disregard of uh of human life. [28:12] Nothing could be further from truth. If [28:14] anything, Israel should, I think, be [28:16] lauded and uh commended for how it [28:21] fights in an impossible situation [28:23] against an enemy whose strategy is use [28:27] human shields, have them killed in order [28:30] to create international pressure against [28:32] Israel. Almost three years after the [28:34] war, Israel found the resources and the [28:38] time to expose that 170 Gazans who were [28:45] first and foremost terrorists and active [28:47] members of Hamas Islamic Jihad [28:50] resistance committees and PFLP were also [28:53] media workers in various international [28:57] and local Gazan media outlets. Legacy [28:59] Media is including the [29:00] >> Legacy Media, AP, AFP, BBC, New York [29:04] Times, Reuters, all of those had [29:07] stringers and we can name them. And if [29:10] people who are listening want to find [29:12] out more, the IDF has an entire website [29:14] where there's names and media outlets of [29:17] each and every of the 170 uh terrorists [29:21] who were masquerading as journalists um [29:24] who they were affiliated with and who [29:26] they worked for. Now let if we go beyond [29:29] the absurdity of that right there are [29:33] NOS's around the world the committee to [29:35] protect journalists and others uh who [29:39] readily and um uncritically took Hamas [29:45] figures and Hamas handouts as gospel and [29:51] >> 70,000 civilians killed [29:53] >> 70,000 civilians and also 270 [29:57] thou 270 so-called journalists were [30:01] allegedly killed by Israel during the [30:04] war. And this has been canonized and [30:06] adopted as truth by the world's most [30:10] prestigious media organizations, the New [30:12] York Times, CNN, BBC, and many others [30:16] who up until today when we're recording [30:19] this podcast, and this is about a week [30:22] after Israel exposed those 170 [30:26] journalists, they haven't retracted. [30:28] They have not said, "Well, okay, this is [30:30] new and very interesting information. [30:33] will go and have a hard and [30:35] investigative look, which is a favorite [30:37] word of uh many journalists when they [30:39] want to sound fancy and as if they're [30:41] doing a good job, will investigate into [30:44] these allegations and will will will [30:47] perhaps stand corrected. I haven't seen [30:50] any such action by any of the leading [30:53] outlets in the world. And I think that [30:55] shows you exactly the quality of their [30:58] journalistic standards and how heavy the [31:02] rot is, how deep the rot is in so many [31:05] international institutions. Um, [31:07] >> speaking of uh of uh failed journalistic [31:10] standards, you have been a regular guest [31:13] on Pierce Morgan's very popular uh [31:16] uncensored show. [31:17] >> Yeah. In your experience, what has that [31:19] been like for you? A and [31:23] the the the the conversations that are [31:25] had on that show, what does that tell [31:27] you about the fundamental [31:29] misunderstanding of this specific war in [31:31] Gaza and the conflict as a whole? [31:34] >> Well, some episodes have been absolute [31:36] freak shows. Some episodes have been [31:39] screaming contests. Some epis episodes [31:41] have been relatively thoughtful debate [31:45] and discourse between people who [31:47] actually [31:48] have some knowledge on the topic and [31:50] some have been I'd say insulting to eard [31:54] drums and intelligence. It's it's a very [31:56] wide array of different episodes. I [32:00] think it's a good example of how [32:03] profitable the business of hating Israel [32:07] and hating Jews and inciting violence [32:11] against Israel is. And if you look at [32:14] the numbers of most online shows, Pierce [32:17] included, you can see that the episodes [32:20] that deal in conspiracy theories against [32:23] Israel, Israel bashing, promoting Jew [32:26] hatred, promoting Israel hated, [32:29] promoting liable and falsehood against [32:32] the IDF and the Israeli government, they [32:34] do exceptionally well. And the more [32:37] unhinged [32:38] uh biased, mentally unstable yet uh [32:43] interesting people you bring on show, [32:46] the more clicks you get. And truth is [32:49] the first victim. Truth, moderation, [32:52] critical thinking, they are the first [32:54] victim when it comes to telling the [32:56] story of Israel. And I think Pierce's [32:58] show is unfortunately a horrible example [33:01] for it. And I told him on air that I [33:05] don't think that he personally is an [33:07] anti-semite. And I think he's pretty [33:09] sensitive to being called and labeled or [33:11] called out for being an anti-semite. And [33:13] I don't think that he essentially is. [33:15] But he sure enough has brought on the [33:18] world's leading anti-semites on his show [33:20] and giving them a tremendous welcoming [33:24] platform uh to spew their hatred and to [33:28] uh share their perverted view on the [33:32] Middle East, on Europe, on the US, on [33:35] Islamization, [33:37] on Jews around the world. And I think uh [33:41] he bears responsibility just like legacy [33:44] media just like the foreign news editor [33:47] on the in the New York Times and CNN and [33:51] AFP Reuters AP AP and Washington Post [33:55] all of them in my mind shouldn't be able [33:58] to sleep well at night knowing the [34:02] decisions that they have made over the [34:04] last three years to take Hamas [34:06] propaganda and turn it into western [34:10] truth. Uh to undermine the very [34:12] legitimacy, the basic legitimacy of [34:14] Israel to fight and defend itself, to [34:18] actively engage in narrative warfare [34:20] against Israel, to disregard truth, to [34:23] look the other way when Hamas was doing [34:27] atrocities and when Hamas lied about [34:29] what they were doing, and to prefer the [34:31] other side's narrative without even [34:33] doing an honest job at assessing the [34:36] truth. And there are so many people that [34:37] I would have want um that they'd face [34:40] scrutiny and have actual responsibility [34:44] and accountability for their decisions. [34:47] I regret the fact that, you know, [34:49] Israeli government threatened to um file [34:54] a lawsuit against the New York Times, [34:56] specifically against Nicholas Kristoff [34:58] for publishing the grotesque allegations [35:02] against Israel, uh regarding sexual [35:06] violence against [35:08] Hamas and other [35:09] >> using dogs. [35:10] >> Yes. You dog rape and all of the other [35:12] horrible things that he alleges. [35:15] the the the Israel said that there were [35:19] going to be legal measures taken. I [35:21] haven't seen them yet. I would love for [35:24] that to happen. I would love for maybe [35:26] not I'm not entirely sure that American [35:29] court would be able to uh actually find [35:34] or a jury would find the New York Times [35:37] guilty. But I would love to see [35:38] discovery. I would love to see the New [35:41] York Times forced to show their [35:44] decision-making process and the [35:46] decisions made by editors to run a story [35:49] that alleges that Israel uses dogs to [35:52] rape Palestinians in custody. Uh, and [35:55] that unfortunately hasn't happened. [35:57] moving forward with uh uh the US [36:00] administration's uh um board of peace uh [36:03] disarmament plan for Hamas. Hamas [36:05] continues to say it will not disarm as [36:07] long as Israeli troops are in Gaza. [36:09] Where does that put uh Israel and what [36:12] do you think is the right actions to to [36:13] to go forward here? [36:15] >> Hamas isn't going to disarm because [36:17] they're a jihadi organization. They're [36:19] sworn to the destruction of the state of [36:21] Israel. I've never seen a jihadi [36:23] organization anywhere else disarm. I've [36:26] seen other uh terrorist or militant [36:29] organizations in uh Colombia, some of [36:32] them in Spain, some of them in Ireland, [36:34] and I've seen other examples around the [36:36] world, but I've never seen a jihadi [36:38] organization, definitely not as extreme [36:40] as Hamas, lay down their weapons. [36:43] Second, I don't think that Hamas would [36:46] have a future in Gaza if they lay down [36:48] their weapons because there would be [36:50] tremendous [36:53] vengeance from the local Gazan [36:57] population against their oppressors and [36:59] there will be a long list of uh scores [37:02] to settle. Kamas has been extremely [37:05] brutal towards the population in Gaza. [37:08] Coercive, brutal, heavy-handed, of [37:10] course, unjust and corrupt. And there [37:12] are a lot of people who have been [37:14] wronged by Kamas and they will claim [37:16] their vengeance. And the only thing [37:18] standing between that reality is Kamas's [37:21] AK-47 and their ability to continue to [37:25] control, dominate, and coers the [37:28] civilian population in Gaza. They've had [37:32] very important allies, UNRA, the [37:34] European Union, many other organizations [37:37] that continue to facilitate and to allow [37:40] Hamas's rule and and and prefer it. But [37:44] >> and that radicalization [37:46] >> and the continued holding hostage of the [37:48] population, radicalization of the [37:51] population and basically not giving them [37:53] any other alternative to another future. [37:56] It's basically the way of jihad or no [38:00] other way or death. We haven't succeeded [38:03] in providing an alternative. We haven't [38:05] really applied ourselves to do it. And [38:07] since Hamas isn't going to disarm the [38:10] American plan and uh Security Council [38:13] resolution 2803 [38:16] unfortunately won't move forward because [38:19] condition number one is Hamas the Gaza [38:22] Strip needs to be dradicalized and [38:25] demilitarized and that's not going to [38:27] happen in any way except for the the IDF [38:31] doing it. As I said in the beginning, I [38:34] don't think Israel can do such a thing [38:37] without pulling the rug underneath the [38:39] feet of Hamas and that is taking away [38:41] their most important asset and those are [38:44] the civilians, the Gaz and civilians as [38:47] that they use as human shields. So how [38:50] Israel will accomplish that is either [38:55] temporarily relocating them to a [38:58] humanitarian zone in Sinai or relocating [39:02] them in a temporary humanitarian zone [39:04] half in Israel, half in the Gaza Strip. [39:07] How however Israel does that, Israel [39:09] needs to get civilians out of the way in [39:12] order to move in and actually defeat [39:15] Hamas in the way that actually the [39:18] definition of defeat and victory in pure [39:21] military terms. That is the enemy [39:23] emerging with their hands up, white flag [39:26] and say, "I surrender. I surrender. You [39:30] dictate the terms. I accept the terms." [39:34] That's victory in war. And that isn't [39:37] where we have Hamas yet. I believe that [39:39] we can uh get Hamas to such a position. [39:43] If we get civilians out of the way and [39:45] if the IDF is given the political [39:48] directive and the state of Israel [39:50] provides the international and political [39:52] environment for Israel to do so. Uh but [39:55] un until that happens, I think sadly [39:59] we're going to have a continued horrible [40:01] humanitarian unfold situation unfold in [40:05] Gaza. People are going to continue to [40:07] suffer. Hamas is going to continue to [40:10] stay in power in what remains of Gaza, [40:14] let's say 40% of the Gaza Strip, and [40:17] Israel will continue to squeeze, [40:19] undermine, kill military leaders and [40:22] operatives, etc. But at the end of the [40:24] day, the problem will not be solved. The [40:27] solution will come only when Hamas is [40:30] institutionally and militarily defeated. [40:33] when they do not have any say about the [40:36] future of Gaza, when the Gaza Strip is [40:39] demilitarized, and when it is [40:41] dradicalized, when there's a new [40:43] education system introduced in Gaza, and [40:46] when there is a new religious system, [40:48] when the mosques and the imams are under [40:51] strict supervision and control, and [40:53] where they the educa educators and the [40:57] imams do not propagate the way of jihad [41:01] and armed resistance against Israel, but [41:03] instead focus on well-being, prosperity, [41:07] and their own future. That isn't really [41:10] around the corner, and there's still a [41:12] lot of work that needs to be done before [41:14] that can happen. Sadly, this Israeli [41:17] government, I think, has failed [41:19] tremendously at creating the [41:20] environment, the conditions that are [41:22] needed for the IDF to be able to do [41:25] that. I hope that we will see change in [41:27] that sense and I hope that Israel will [41:29] be able to actually allocate the [41:31] relevant resources and create the [41:32] conditions on the ground that'll be [41:34] conducive to victory. victory meaning [41:37] the defeat of the enemy, the complete [41:39] dismantling of their military [41:41] capabilities and their political control [41:43] over Gaza and for there to be hope for [41:46] something else [41:48] in in the Gaza Strip and uh to begin a [41:52] slow [41:54] deliberate process that'll take at least [41:56] a generation to [42:00] re-educate Gazans away from the path of [42:03] jihad and radical Islam and towards a or [42:06] benign moderate interpretation, [42:09] something along the lines of the [42:11] Emirates or other countries that have [42:14] made a very clear distinction between [42:16] their Muslim faith and [42:21] political Islam and Islamism where they [42:23] are proud of their Muslim heritage and [42:26] they love their religion and they're [42:28] proud of uh their background and their [42:31] history and culture which I respect but [42:34] say very clearly We are not going to [42:37] have crazy imams or terrorists dictate [42:40] and decide policy. [42:42] >> Jonathan Kenrikus, it's been an absolute [42:43] pleasure having you on our show on East [42:45] to West and getting to hear your [42:46] insight, which I've heard for years now, [42:48] but getting to to speak face to face [42:50] like this is a is a true honor. So, [42:51] thank you very much. [42:52] >> Honor is mine. Thank you for having me [42:54] on. [42:54] >> Thank you for listening to East to West. [42:56] If you enjoyed this episode, let us know [42:58] your thoughts in the comments below. And [43:00] if there's a particular topic, story, or [43:03] voice from the region you'd like us to [43:05] explore, we'd love to hear from you. So, [43:07] please reach out and of course follow [43:09] East to West on Instagram and X so you [43:11] don't miss what's coming
