Transcript [00:00] So, over 10 people were killed in Saudi [00:01] Arabia this week when a series of [00:03] missiles hit the international airport [00:05] fired by an Iranian proxy, the Houthis. [00:07] Citizens of not just Saudi Arabia, but [00:10] US, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan were killed and [00:12] over 300 people were injured. The [00:14] Houthis have promised more such attacks [00:17] and have warned people to not go travel [00:19] to Saudi Arabia. And this is now turning [00:20] into a full-blown out war that is only [00:23] likely to get worse. So, what is going [00:26] on? Well, most people in the West look [00:29] at the region of the Middle East and see [00:30] one thing, Arabs, Muslims, all lumped [00:32] together and usually all lumped together [00:34] against Israel. But, the reality is a [00:36] region full of rival kingdoms, rival [00:38] sects, rival ideologies, and rival [00:40] ambitions. Where Sunni fights Shia, [00:42] where monarchies fight revolutionaries, [00:44] where close allies stab each other in [00:45] the back, and where the biggest threat [00:47] to most Arab governments comes from the [00:49] radicals inside the Muslim world itself. [00:51] Yemen is all of this packed into one, [00:54] and the Houthis come from Yemen. At the [00:56] center of the story, however, sits Saudi [00:58] Arabia, the country that wants to lead [01:00] the Muslim world and that has spent the [01:02] last few years playing what I would like [01:04] to call the waiting game. The waiting [01:06] game is a strategy of hoping that the [01:08] radicals on their borders will calm down [01:10] and if you just give them enough time, [01:12] give them a truce, give them space, and [01:14] stay out of their way, everything will [01:16] be okay. This is a critical mistake, one [01:19] that ends up just empowering the radical [01:20] terrorists in our midst. And Saudi [01:22] Arabia is learning that in their airport [01:24] right now. To understand this, however, [01:26] we need to look at a map because the [01:29] correlation between Yemen, the Houthis, [01:30] and Saudi Arabia is not just an [01:32] ideological one. Yemen sits at the [01:34] bottom corner of the Arabian Peninsula, [01:36] right under Saudi Arabia, and the two [01:38] share a long mountain border of more [01:40] than a thousand kilometers. Yemen also [01:42] sits on one side of the narrow strait at [01:44] the mouth of the Red Sea, and the [01:45] passage ships use to travel between Asia [01:48] and the Suez Canal. So, whoever controls [01:50] Yemen's coast can threaten one of the [01:52] most important shipping lanes on earth. [01:54] Something we now know the Houthis are [01:56] trying very hard to do. But moving away [01:59] from today, the history between these [02:01] two countries runs very, very deep. In [02:03] 1934, the founder of Saudi Arabia went [02:06] to war with a ruler of northern Yemen [02:07] and won three southern provinces, taking [02:10] control of them, including the province [02:12] where the airport was attacked this [02:13] week. Plenty of Yemenis have never [02:15] accepted this border, and the Houthis [02:17] certainly haven't, which causes issues, [02:19] as you could probably imagine. For the [02:21] Saudis, Yemen is the one place where [02:23] hostile force can sit right on their [02:25] doorstep, and for 100 years they have [02:27] fought to keep any such force away from [02:29] it. Saudi Arabia, seeking to rebuild [02:31] itself into something new, something [02:33] modern, something different, has really [02:35] tried to keep conflict at a minimum, but [02:38] this conflict is not just ideological, [02:41] although Saudis and Houthis do not [02:42] believe the same things. It really is, [02:44] in essence, about land and borders. What [02:46] do I mean by that? Well, northern Yemen [02:48] has a large community that follows a [02:50] small branch of Shia Islam, quite [02:52] different from the Shia Islam of Iran. [02:53] And for about 1,000 years, their [02:55] religious leaders, who they called [02:56] Imams, ruled the north. They were [02:58] separate from the rest of Yemen, and [03:00] when army officers from regular Yemen [03:02] overthrew the last Imam in 1962 that [03:05] ruled the north, they declared a [03:06] republic with Egypt's backing. Saudi [03:09] Arabia actually sided with the Imams, [03:11] because back then, the danger on its [03:13] border was the Egyptian revolutionary [03:15] nationalism. The Saudis didn't fight [03:17] these people because they were Shia and [03:19] because of their ideological [03:20] differences, they fought whoever brings [03:22] the hostile revolution to their [03:24] doorstep, that point was the [03:26] Egyptian-backed leaders. In the 1990s, [03:28] in the far north of Yemen, right on the [03:30] Saudi border, cleric from a family named [03:32] al-Houthi started a religious revival [03:34] movement, and that's where the Houthis [03:36] got their name. After America invaded [03:38] Iraq in 2003, his movement adopted a [03:40] slogan, [03:41] and wait for it, "God is great, death to [03:43] America, death to Israel, curse on the [03:46] Jews, victory to Islam." That's still [03:48] their slogan today, and it's printed on [03:50] their flags, the Houthi slogan. The [03:52] Houthis looked to the Islamic Republic [03:54] of Iran for inspiration. Its revolution, [03:56] its Hezbollah, its war on America and [03:58] Israel and Iran were very happy to be [04:00] looked at. In 2004, the Yemeni army then [04:03] killed the movement's founder. His [04:04] brother took over and over the next 6 [04:06] years the government fought six wars [04:08] against the Houthis and lost every one [04:09] of them. It is important to establish [04:11] the fact that the Houthis are not the [04:13] government of Yemen. They are a separate [04:14] group within Yemen and these two are [04:16] constantly in conflict. In 2009, the [04:18] Houthis crossed into Saudi Arabia and [04:20] killed more than 100 Saudi soldiers. And [04:22] this was when the Saudis really [04:23] understood that the people in their [04:25] border were far more dangerous than just [04:27] a tribal militia, a small group that [04:30] causes issues within Yemen itself. Then [04:32] came the Arab Spring. In 2011, Yemen's [04:35] long-time president was forced to hand [04:37] power to his deputy in a deal that the [04:39] Gulf states sponsored as they were [04:40] terrified of conflict on the border and [04:42] wanted to become the people down who [04:44] were demanding that this leader of 30 [04:46] years step down already. However, the [04:48] old president furious at being pushed [04:50] out made a cynical alliance with the [04:52] Houthis. And in September 2014, the [04:55] Houthis marched into Yemen's capital and [04:56] took it. And a few months later the new [04:58] president fled to Saudi Arabia. An [05:00] Iranian lawmaker close to the supreme [05:03] leader bragged at the time that Yemen's [05:04] capital had become the fourth Arab [05:06] capital under Iran's influence after [05:08] Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Iran's [05:11] militias in Iraq to the north, Iran's [05:13] Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now a Houthi [05:15] militia chanting death to America and [05:17] curse on the Jews holding the capital of [05:19] the country on Saudi Arabia's southern [05:20] border with Iran's backing. And so, with [05:23] this knowledge in hand, the Saudis did [05:25] what any country would do when an enemy [05:27] shows up on its doorstep. In March 2015, [05:30] Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab [05:31] states into Yemen with the UAE as its [05:34] main partner and the man who ran that [05:35] war was the young defense minister who [05:37] is now the Saudi crown prince. But this [05:39] war turned out to be far harder than [05:41] anyone in Saudi Arabia expected for two [05:43] reasons. The first is that Iran poured [05:45] everything it had into the Houthis. In [05:47] 2015, they had old rifles and whatever [05:50] they had looted from the Yemeni army, [05:51] but within a few years, with Iranian [05:53] parts, Iranian designs, and Iranian [05:55] advisers, they were firing ballistic [05:57] missiles at the Saudi capital and [05:58] long-range drones at Saudi oil [06:00] facilities. The Houthis hid their [06:02] fighters and launchers amongst [06:03] civilians, in neighborhoods, near [06:05] schools and hospitals, and stole so much [06:07] food aid that in 2019, the UN's own food [06:10] agency suspended parts of its deliveries [06:13] in Houthi areas. I find it almost [06:15] astounding that this is a proven tactic [06:18] of Iranian proxies, and yet people [06:19] refuse to accept it as if it's a fact. [06:21] But, similar to the situation in Gaza, [06:23] when the civilian deaths came, because [06:25] of course they would come, the world [06:27] blamed Saudi Arabia for attacking Yemen. [06:30] The second reason is that the West tied [06:32] Saudi Arabia's hands. In 2018, when [06:35] Saudi-backed forces were closing in on [06:37] the Houthis' main port, their lifeline [06:38] for Iranian weapons, Western pressure [06:40] forced them to stop and sign a ceasefire [06:42] there, and the Houthis kept the port. In [06:44] 2019, drones and missiles struck the [06:46] heart of the Saudi oil industry and [06:47] knocked out about half of the kingdom's [06:49] oil production overnight. And yet, [06:50] America really didn't help Saudi Arabia [06:52] a whole lot. And in 2021, the new [06:54] American administration took the Houthis [06:57] off America's terrorist list and cut off [06:58] support for Saudi offensive operations, [07:00] and the Houthis celebrated by launching [07:02] a major offensive. This is a mistake [07:03] that I think by now most people have [07:05] understood should never have happened. [07:06] You all know I am a big backer of [07:08] Western ideologies, but Western [07:10] intervention in the Middle East is often [07:11] a tremendously problematic thing. As the [07:14] interests of the West are not the same [07:16] as the interests of the Middle East. [07:17] They want calm, minimal wars, which is [07:20] of course ideal, but it doesn't work at [07:22] all when you are dealing with radicals [07:25] who really don't like peace. Because [07:27] they see the restraint of the West not [07:30] just as weakness, but as more time to [07:31] make themselves stronger. But, we'll get [07:34] to that in a second. On top of all of [07:36] that, the coalition that Saudi Arabia [07:38] had built against the Houthis actually [07:40] fell apart in 2019. The UAE pulled most [07:43] of its troops out and left behind [07:44] southern separatists who wanted their [07:46] own state and who fought the [07:47] Saudi-backed government as often as they [07:49] fought the Houthis. This was honestly a [07:51] kind of tragedy because two Gulf allies, [07:54] which are both enemies of Iran, who are [07:55] both partners in the same war and [07:57] understood the importance of it, ended [07:58] up backing rival sides inside of it, but [08:01] that is for another episode. By 2022, [08:04] the Saudis were exhausted and they [08:05] started playing the waiting game. The UN [08:07] brokered a truce. The Saudis stopped [08:09] bombing. mostly stopped firing at Saudi [08:11] cities and the Saudis replaced Yemen's [08:13] president with a council of anti-Houthi [08:14] factions. In 2023, the Saudi ambassador [08:17] even flew to Yemen's capital to sit down [08:19] with the Houthis and talk about a [08:20] permanent peace about the same time that [08:22] Saudi Arabia tried to restore relations [08:24] with Iran itself. The thinking was [08:26] simple enough. If we leave them alone, [08:28] they'll leave us alone and we can all go [08:30] on with building our future. Ha. Alas. [08:34] Then came October 7th. Weeks after the [08:36] Hamas massacre, the Houthis decided it [08:38] was time to hijack a cargo ship in the [08:40] Red Sea and started firing at commercial [08:42] shipping and at Israel and they kept it [08:44] up for 2 years and Saudi Arabia it kept [08:47] quiet, kept the truce and kept waiting [08:49] hoping that if the Houthis were busy [08:51] with Israel and the West, they would [08:52] leave the kingdom alone, but [08:53] unfortunately, this didn't work for [08:56] them. At the end of 2025, the coalition [08:59] cracked one more time. In December, the [09:01] UAE-backed southern separatists swept [09:03] into two huge Yemeni provinces on the [09:05] Saudi border and declared they were on [09:07] their way to independence. Saudi Arabia [09:09] bombed them and drove them back and the [09:11] separatist leader fled the country and [09:13] according to the Saudis, Emirati [09:14] officials helped him escape to the UAE. [09:16] The UAE pulled its last forces out of [09:18] Yemen, the two closest allies against [09:20] Iran on the Arabian Peninsula ended up [09:22] fighting each other whilst Iran's [09:24] militias watched and applauded. Now, [09:27] come back to present day. When America [09:29] and Israel go to war with Iran, Iran [09:31] then of course chokes the waterways in [09:33] the Gulf where most of Saudi oil [09:35] normally sails out, so the Saudis push [09:36] their exports across the country by [09:38] pipeline to the Red Sea coast and by the [09:40] summer their tanker traffic past Yemen [09:43] was about eight times higher than the [09:44] year before. The Saudis economy now [09:46] depended on the one waterway the Houthis [09:48] sit right next to. Their hope that they [09:50] could just wait this out was proving to [09:53] not really work. I think to understand [09:55] the Saudis, the Gulf states and why they [09:56] play this back and forth game, we need [09:58] to understand the difference in [09:59] mentality between the modernized Arab [10:01] countries and the radicals that are [10:02] constantly fighting them. The Saudis [10:04] have an enormous amount to lose. They [10:06] have oil terminals, airports, tourism, a [10:08] royal family that wants to stay in [10:09] power, a crown prince with a plan to [10:11] transform the whole economy by 2030 and [10:14] every one of those things depends on [10:16] calm in the region. So, their instinct [10:18] is to buy quiet with money, with [10:20] mediation, with truces, even with a deal [10:22] with Iran itself and they only fight [10:24] hard when an enemy shows up right on [10:25] their border. And because so much of [10:27] their military strength comes from [10:29] America, they're constantly watching [10:31] Washington. When America looks [10:32] committed, the Saudis act tough and when [10:34] America looks unreliable, they hedge and [10:36] go back to the waiting game. Remember, [10:38] Saudi Arabia is vying for the leadership [10:40] of the Muslim world. They need to look [10:42] like they can get and keep their act [10:44] together and that is probably the most [10:47] important optic of all. However, the [10:49] Houthis think in exactly the opposite [10:51] way. They run a poor broken country. [10:53] They can't pay salaries or keep the [10:54] lights on and the one thing they can [10:56] offer their people is the image of a [10:57] small movement standing up to Saudi [10:58] Arabia, America and Israel and so for [11:00] them fighting is really the whole point [11:02] and peace is what exposes their failure. [11:04] They have obviously also ideological [11:06] beliefs in creating chaos and trying to [11:08] rule the world. They have almost nothing [11:10] to lose. A few cheap drones can do [11:12] millions of dollars of damage and they [11:14] only need to hurt the Saudis, never [11:15] really to actually beat them. And most [11:18] importantly, they read restraint as [11:20] weakness. Every time the Saudis signed a [11:22] truce, sat down to talk or asked [11:24] Washington to hold off, the Houthis see [11:26] an enemy who's afraid of them and they [11:27] use that quiet to rearm and come back [11:30] harder. They only pull back when the [11:31] pain becomes too heavy to bear or when [11:33] Iran tells them to, and even then it's [11:35] just a pause to regroup. So, the Saudis' [11:38] caution, the very thing that means to [11:39] keep them safe, is exactly what invites [11:41] the next attack. And that's the lesson [11:42] that Israel learned 3 years ago, and [11:44] unfortunately, the Gulf has taken a very [11:46] long time to learn it now. Throughout [11:48] this year, every time America got close [11:50] to hitting Iran, it was the Gulf states, [11:52] Saudi Arabia among them, who picked up [11:54] the phone and asked American president [11:55] to hold off because they were terrified [11:57] that a bigger war would mean Iranian [11:58] missiles on their cities and their oil. [12:00] Back then, Israelis were furious because [12:03] it seemed so obviously a mistake, and [12:05] now I think it's clear to say it was. [12:07] Because look at what all that caution [12:09] has brought them. The Houthis tore up [12:10] the truce with Saudi Arabia anyway, [12:12] declared a naval blockade on the [12:13] kingdom, and started hitting Saudi oil [12:15] facilities. And since then, they fired [12:17] at the Saudi national oil company, at a [12:19] power station in the holy city of [12:20] Medina, at the schools, at the airports [12:22] in the Saudi capital. And the Saudis now [12:24] need Washington to help them strike the [12:26] Houthis, and reportedly, the bombs were [12:28] already loaded on the planes when the [12:29] strikes were called off. Like, this [12:31] week, Iran's militia killed travelers [12:33] sitting in Saudi airports. The Gulf [12:36] states have been trying to stop [12:37] escalations by holding America back, but [12:39] the escalations come to them anyway. The [12:42] Saudis also made another critical [12:43] mistake. On top of failing to learn what [12:45] Israel learned about the radicals, which [12:47] is that protecting yourself from the [12:49] enemy has to be a number one priority, [12:51] above politics, above pride, and above [12:53] all positions, Saudi Arabia spent tens [12:55] of billion dollars on American weapons, [12:57] and it still relies on foreign crews to [12:59] protect its oil. With a battery run by [13:01] the Greek military guarding its main Red [13:02] Sea export terminal. All of that is very [13:04] nice, but Israel, a country that's a [13:06] fraction of its size, spent the last two [13:08] decades building a layered shield, from [13:10] interceptors that knock down short-range [13:12] rockets to interceptors that destroy [13:14] ballistic missiles above the atmosphere. [13:17] And it built most of it at home because [13:19] Israel learned long ago that nobody else [13:21] will defend you. The best air defense [13:23] partner in the region is sitting right [13:25] next to Saudi Arabia this whole time, [13:27] And Saudi Arabia is keeping it at arm's [13:29] length, holding on to its anti-Israel [13:31] position, insisting there'll be no [13:33] normalization without a Palestinian [13:34] state, and condemning Israel loudly at [13:36] every opportunity to keep its reputation [13:38] in the Muslim world. Now, look at the [13:39] UAE just to compare with this stupidity, [13:42] which made the opposite choice 6 years [13:44] ago. And when Iran rained missiles and [13:46] drones on it this year, Israel sent a [13:48] defense battery to help defend it. As we [13:50] have covered in an earlier episode, the [13:52] Saudis reported the asked Israel for [13:54] help against the Houthis anyway. Would [13:56] you look at that? The kingdom that wants [13:58] to lead the Muslim world spent years [14:00] refusing to stand next to Israel, and [14:03] now it's quietly asking the Zionists how [14:05] to protect its airports. But this is not [14:07] just about learning from Israel's [14:08] defense tech. It's about something much, [14:11] much bigger that the Middle East needs [14:13] to learn. You see, I have a theory. I [14:14] think that this attack on Saudi airports [14:17] could be a thing that tips the scales, [14:18] and I wouldn't be surprised if the next [14:20] time American bombers are loaded up for [14:22] Iran, the phone call from Saudi Arabia [14:24] says go instead of wait. Just FYI, there [14:26] are reports that America asked Israel to [14:28] attack Iran just this week because they [14:31] can't do it for their own reasons, but [14:33] we're seeing changes and shifts behind [14:35] the scenes that might not be public to [14:36] our eyes. The Saudis are hopefully, [14:39] hopefully starting to learn what Israel [14:41] learned unfortunately on October 7th 3 [14:43] years ago. [14:45] Israel had told itself that Hamas was [14:47] deterred, that if it cared about jobs [14:48] and money and quiet, they were given [14:50] enough time to settle down. And that [14:52] belief was paid for with 1,200 lives in [14:54] a single morning. Here's the thing. You [14:57] cannot wait out radicals. A movement [15:00] whose slogan is death to America and [15:02] curse on the Jews has no interest in [15:04] calming down. And every pause you give [15:06] it is just time for them to rearm. We've [15:09] now seen this in multiple places across [15:11] multiple timelines. The Saudis gave the [15:14] Houthis 4 years of truce, and the [15:16] Houthis spent those years digging in and [15:18] waiting for Iran to hand them the right [15:19] moment. Iran handed it to them this [15:21] summer. This is the lesson the whole [15:24] West needs to be learning. Every time [15:26] someone in Washington or London or Paris [15:28] says, "We should give Iran more time, [15:30] another round of talks, another 24 [15:32] hours." Look at the departure hall in [15:34] the Saudi airport. That's what more time [15:37] looks like, death and destruction. So, [15:39] how did a militia from one of the [15:40] poorest countries in the Arab world end [15:42] up killing travelers in the capital of [15:44] the richest one? Well, now you know. The [15:46] Middle East is a region of rivals, and [15:48] Saudi Arabia has been fighting Iran's [15:50] revolutions on its own doorstep for more [15:52] than a decade. And yes, its hand has [15:54] been tied by the West, but more [15:55] importantly, by a mistaken ideology that [15:59] if they just wait, if they just hold [16:01] back, that will buy them peace. It's [16:04] just not true. Israel is not just at the [16:07] forefront of thinking about tech and [16:09] developing defense systems, it is also [16:11] at the forefront of its understanding of [16:12] what it means to be dealing with radical [16:15] Islamization and what peace could [16:17] potentially look like. Because this is [16:19] no way over. The Houthis still hold [16:21] Yemen's capital, the north and most of [16:22] the Red Sea coast, and the Saudis' [16:24] backside is still a patchwork of [16:25] militias that don't fully trust one [16:27] another. The Saudis themselves are still [16:29] complicated. Back in May, they refused [16:31] to let America use their airspace and [16:32] bases for an operation in the Gulf. [16:34] They're still careful about how close [16:36] they look to Washington, and they still [16:37] have to answer to a public that's deeply [16:39] hostile to Israel. They're playing one [16:40] game externally and one game internally, [16:43] and that is just not going to work. [16:46] Saudi Arabia hasn't fully abandoned the [16:48] waiting game yet, and whether it does [16:50] may decide on what happens in Iran in [16:52] the coming weeks. Let's hope it's a good [16:54] thing. But here's what I want you to [16:56] take away from this episode. Saudi [16:57] Arabia wants to lead the Middle East. [16:59] The leadership in this region means [17:00] facing the radicals instead of hoping [17:02] they go away. Israel learned that lesson [17:04] 3 years ago, and it has spent every day [17:06] since proving that strength works in [17:08] Gaza, in Lebanon, in Iran, and in Yemen. [17:11] Now the country that wants to lead the [17:12] Muslim world is learning the same harsh [17:14] lesson in its oil fields and in its [17:16] airports. I pray it learns it fast [17:18] because the faster the region [17:19] understands what Israel understands, the [17:21] faster the war on all of us ends, and [17:23] the sooner the people of Yemen, of Saudi [17:25] Arabia, of Iran, of Lebanon, and of [17:27] Israel can finally live without missiles [17:29] over their heads. Peace doesn't come [17:31] through truces and negotiations, but [17:33] rather through strength. I'm Amir Okey, [17:35] and I will see you next time.
