Transcript [00:01] Good afternoon and welcome to the Middle [00:03] East Forums weekly podcast. I want to [00:05] thank you all for joining us this [00:06] afternoon and for your continued support [00:08] of the critically important work that we [00:09] do here at MEF. I'm pleased to introduce [00:13] today's guest, Colonel Iran Lairman of [00:16] the Israel Defense Forces Reserves, who [00:18] serves as deputy director of the [00:19] Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and [00:21] Security and former Deputy Director for [00:24] F foreign Policy and International [00:25] Affairs at the National Security Council [00:27] in the Israeli Prime's Office. He held [00:30] senior posts in the IDF military [00:32] intelligence for over 20 years and also [00:34] served for eight years as director of [00:35] the Israel and Middle East Office of the [00:37] American Jewish Committee. This [00:39] afternoon, Dr. Laramin will be [00:41] discussing Israel and the Hessemites, [00:43] sharing his insights on this complex [00:44] relationship, its history, and its [00:46] future. After Aaron's initial remarks, [00:49] we'll be happy to take any of your [00:51] questions. So, if you'd like to ask a [00:52] question, please feel free to use the [00:53] Q&A function at the bottom of your [00:55] screens to enter your submission, and [00:57] I'll do my best to get to as many of [00:58] your questions as possible. I once again [01:01] once again ask all of you to please, [01:03] please, please keep your submissions to [01:04] questions only. If you'd like to post a [01:06] comment, you can do so at the chat [01:08] function, but please limit submissions [01:10] in the Q&A to questions only. Today's [01:12] podcast is being recorded and will be [01:14] available for future viewing. So, please [01:16] do share the link with those in your [01:17] networks who you think would be [01:18] interested in learning more on this very [01:20] important topic. Welcome Erin and thank [01:23] you for joining us this afternoon. I [01:24] hand the floor over to you. [01:25] >> Thank you. Thank you Lori. Look uh for [01:28] me the Hashimite connection or [01:30] relationship is to some extent a [01:33] personal matter. when it was uh with [01:37] AJC. Um I actually had the pleasure of [01:40] uh visiting with a leadership group uh [01:44] King Abdullah II at his uh at his home, [01:48] not the palace but the villa outside [01:50] Aman. And we had a long and fascinating [01:53] conversation [01:55] essentially a friendly one. And as we [01:58] were coming out, I asked his permission [02:00] to say something personal. Um he was [02:03] very gracious and I said uh your majesty [02:06] if it had not been for that the [02:09] Jordanian military 1948 was commanded [02:12] and led by gentlemen I probably wouldn't [02:15] be here uh because um let's say that the [02:19] treatment of prisoners of war by other [02:21] Arab neighbors of ours has not been uh [02:24] stellar. [02:26] Um [02:28] but my father was a P in Jordan [02:33] uh for a prolonged period of time [02:37] and uh taken from the old city of [02:40] Jerusalem [02:42] and um I have to say he was treated [02:45] decently and came home safe and sound [02:48] nine months later. [02:50] And so that set me uh uh thinking and [02:53] and learning about the this relationship [02:56] and the more I knew [02:59] the uh the more I I appreciate the [03:03] complexity of this relationship. [03:07] Uh let me put it like this. [03:10] No relationship in the region is is [03:13] older and more complex than the one we [03:16] have with the Hasheite family. As such [03:20] the uh the family that uh came out of [03:23] the Mecca, they were the custodians of [03:26] the two holy places uh for the best part [03:30] of a thousand years uh under various [03:34] sovereigns. For hundreds of years, it [03:37] was Ottoman sovereignty, [03:39] but they rebelled against the Ottomans [03:42] during World War I [03:44] >> in conjunction with the British [03:47] intelligence services [03:50] command in Cairo. We [03:54] many people are familiar with this story [03:56] due to a famous film Lawrence of Arabia [04:00] and the Hasheite family led by the [04:03] Sharif Hussein who was the custodian of [04:06] of the holy places and his sons Thisel [04:11] and Abdullah rebelled against the [04:14] Ottomans and joined the British in the [04:18] effort to drive the Ottoman Empire out [04:19] of the Arabic speaking lands. [04:22] uh of of uh the Ottoman Empire. [04:27] They were promised in return an Arab [04:30] kingdom that would extend from their [04:33] current from what was then the current [04:36] domain in the Hijaz all the way to what [04:38] is now the nor the southern border of of [04:41] Turkey or the northern borders of [04:44] northern Syria. [04:46] But we know for certain because we uh [04:48] we've read very carefully, some of us [04:51] more carefully than others, my late uh [04:54] professor El Kaduri more than most uh [04:58] the exchange of letters between the [05:00] British command uh between the actual [05:05] commission, high commissioner in Cairo [05:07] uh Mechmong and uh and the the Sharif [05:11] Hussein and his sons. And we know that [05:14] they understood that the land that we [05:17] call the land of Israel [05:20] uh which is in British terms was called [05:23] Palestine and some Arabs have picked [05:25] this term and started using it didn't [05:27] use it before [05:30] Philistine that land was excluded from [05:33] the promise to the Hashemites and they [05:35] knew it. How do we know that they knew [05:37] it? Because in December in in in uh [05:41] January 1919 [05:44] as the uh peace conference that we know [05:48] as Versailles that was actually taking [05:50] place in Paris was underway [05:53] uh Lawrence arranged for the leader of [05:55] the Zionist movement [05:58] Kitzma [06:00] to meet and and and negotiate with [06:05] Prince Fiser the most prominent [06:09] of the two sons [06:11] and sign an agreement. And this [06:14] agreement speaks very clearly of two [06:19] national entities. It doesn't speak of [06:21] states specifically with two national [06:24] entities living side by side, the Jewish [06:27] one and and it even encourages close [06:30] Jewish settlement on the land and the [06:34] Arab kingdom that was to come. So had [06:38] the file vitzman agreement been allowed [06:42] to stand the entire history of the [06:45] region the entire history of the [06:47] conflict could have been very very [06:49] different [06:51] but the this was a three-way game [06:53] unfortunately there were promises to the [06:56] Jews there were promises to the Arabs [06:58] they were not contradictory common to [07:01] what you may read all over the place [07:04] they were not contradictory but there [07:06] was a contradictory promise made to the [07:09] French [07:11] that they would dominate Syria and [07:14] Lebanon. The the lines were drawn by two [07:18] mid-level officials, Mier Gor Pico. [07:22] People refer to him very often just as [07:24] Pico and um and and Christopher Sykes. [07:28] It's known as the Sykes Pico agreement. [07:31] uh it was uh uh secretly concluded uh [07:36] during the war and it promised France a [07:39] prominent position in the northern parts [07:43] of northern northwestern parts of this [07:46] Arab domain [07:48] and Fisal ended up being driven out of [07:52] Damascus [07:53] by the French who created uh their own [07:58] mandatory system in Syria and Lebanon. [08:01] carved Lebanon out of Syria, carved [08:04] Syria up into several pieces which later [08:07] reunited, drove the Hashimmites out and [08:11] of course that made the the the letter [08:14] the agreement the the the words of the [08:17] agreement defunct nar as they say in [08:21] French and and by the way Fis said this [08:23] right from the beginning if my the [08:25] promises to me will not be kept I will [08:27] not be bound by this agreement [08:30] What happened is that the British in [08:32] order to compensate gave fison the [08:35] kingdom of Iraq. This artificial [08:38] creature of Kurds, Sunnis and Shia which [08:43] even today as the last American soldier [08:46] has left is eering con constantly on on [08:50] the edge of an abyss. It was created in [08:53] order to compensate FISA for the [08:56] humiliation of he suffered at the hands [08:59] of the French. And by the way, Vitzman [09:01] and King Fisel of Iraq remained in in in [09:05] contact exchange letters remained on [09:08] friendly terms to his last day to f to [09:12] to Fiser's last day in the 30s. [09:15] The other son Abdullah was given and [09:19] again as compensation [09:21] by an act of of the uh of the col of of [09:27] uh um colonies uh Churchill Winston [09:31] Churchill [09:33] uh colonial secretary [09:36] gave [09:38] the eastern part of what was at the time [09:41] considered the British mandatory [09:44] Palestine [09:45] the land of Israel on its eastern part, [09:49] what we call Jordan today, gave it to [09:52] King to at the time Prince Abdullah as a [09:54] a prince uh a princely holding an [09:58] emirate [10:00] which later in 1946 became a kingdom, an [10:03] independent kingdom. [10:07] Even then and and as you know some [10:10] elements in the Zionist movement [10:11] resented this and uh for years the line [10:15] of the Jaboteski movement was that we [10:18] have the there are two banks to the [10:21] Jordan and both are ours and that that [10:25] act uh was a betrayal of of the British [10:29] mandate. [10:31] But we uh over time of course we came to [10:34] accept uh the Hashimite presence on that [10:38] side of the of the river and [10:42] build a relationship. [10:45] Uh there were regular contacts. [10:49] Um Israeli Zionist leaders met with [10:54] Abdullah. He was uh medically treated by [10:58] Jewish doctors in Jerusalem. Um and uh [11:03] in 1946 for example when Benorian now [11:08] the uh dominant figure in in the Zalist [11:11] movement in in the Yishu in the [11:14] pre-state uh situation [11:17] wanted to persuade President Truman that [11:21] he should support the Jew a Jewish [11:24] state. to support [11:27] an end to the British mandate and a a [11:31] Jewish state. And he knew that Truman [11:34] would not support a the total annexation [11:38] of all of the land of Israel west of the [11:41] river into the Jewish state. So he on [11:46] the basis of contacts with Abdullah, he [11:49] put formally before the Americans [11:53] through a letter to Judge Frankfurt [11:56] plan to divide [11:58] western land of the western land of [12:01] Israel between what he called uh Judea [12:04] at the time the third and the name [12:06] Israel was not yet used and Abdelah. [12:10] Abdelah, that is to say King Abdullah's [12:14] domain, King Abdullah's kingdom. And I [12:17] have to say the lines that he drew, the [12:20] approximate lines that he drew were very [12:23] close to what we ended up with uh after [12:26] the bitter war of 1948. [12:31] And he believed that at the time based [12:34] on contacts that Gulame mayor and others [12:36] had with Abdullah that the Hashemites [12:40] would consent to this partition and to [12:44] the creation of the Jewish state and [12:46] establish peace with it. The Hashemites [12:51] and the Zionist movement had a common [12:53] enemy. [12:54] The common enemy was [12:58] Hajamin Husseini, the Palestinian leader [13:01] who has spent the war under Hitler's [13:04] uh uh opices in Berlin, fulminating [13:08] against the Jews, [13:10] arranging for participation of his [13:13] Muslim troops in the extermination of [13:17] European jewelry, encouraging Hitler to [13:20] go on and on in constant touch with [13:23] Himler. [13:24] This is the man who came back and and [13:27] and was from and from Cairo was planning [13:30] to dominate the Palestinian struggle. [13:34] And of obviously he was an enemy of both [13:36] the Zanist movement and of king now King [13:40] Abdullah the first in Jordan. [13:45] But uh tragically when gold mayor again [13:49] went to see Abdullah on the eve of the [13:52] declaration of independence in May 1948, [13:58] he with a tone of regret told her that [14:03] he cannot stay out that the Arab League [14:08] essentially has determined was [14:10] determined to go to war and Jordan will [14:13] not day out. It was almost heartbreaking [14:17] for Golden Mayor. She came back quite [14:19] distraught. Uh but there was nothing [14:22] that could be done about this. And [14:24] indeed the Jordanian military which was [14:26] the most effective of all Arab armies uh [14:30] took [14:31] the good the Etsion block and uh its Jew [14:36] some of its Jews were slaughtered by the [14:38] locals and then many taken prisoner and [14:42] uh two weeks later it subdued the Jewish [14:46] quarter in Jerusalem where my father was [14:48] one of the fighters and uh and many were [14:51] taken prisoner and the city was ended up [14:54] being divided for the next 19 years. [14:58] They conquered [15:01] uh the areas which later came to be [15:03] called the west bank, that is to say the [15:05] west bank of Jordanian control west of [15:08] the river. [15:11] But by October 48 uh [15:15] the two militaries uh the commander the [15:18] Jordanian commander in Jerusalem [15:20] Abdalatal and the Israeli commander late [15:23] of great fame Mushe Dian came to an [15:26] agreement basically on stabilizing the [15:28] situation in the city. And here I want [15:30] to say something quite radical. I think [15:32] Benorian preferred to see Jerusalem [15:36] divided between him and Abdullah [15:40] rather than even if Israel at the time [15:43] would have conquered it, it stood the [15:45] risk of being forced to abandon the [15:48] whole of Jerusalem which under the UN [15:51] partition plan was designed to be a [15:53] corpus separat not part of the Jewish [15:56] state, an internationally managed city [15:59] or some some such fantasy. [16:02] uh we accepted the 48 partition 47 [16:06] partition plan but this was the most [16:08] absurd part of it and Bengorian [16:12] certainly wanted to retain as the [16:14] capital of Israel the Jewish parts the [16:17] densely populated Jewish parts of [16:19] Jerusalem which at the time constituted [16:21] almost one quarter of the entire issue [16:25] and so he saw in the partition of the [16:29] city between Israel and Jordan probably [16:33] a way out of this trap. [16:36] And uh for for him the most important [16:38] thing were not the holy places but [16:41] rather the living functional [16:45] uh heart of the of the new state which [16:48] was to be Jewish Jerusalem [16:53] and um moral this more or less held for [16:57] 19 years. There were serious talks about [17:00] peace going on. Uh there were there [17:04] constant contacts and [17:08] then is Dian and others went to talk to [17:12] to Abdullah to obtain the release of the [17:16] prisoners of war, my father included. [17:20] And uh by 1950 there was a serious [17:23] discussion about the possibility of [17:24] peace between the kingdom of Jordan and [17:27] and and Israel. But then Abdullah was [17:30] assassinated on the temple mount by one [17:33] of [17:35] Hajamin al Husseini's followers. [17:39] Uh his direct successor King Talal was [17:43] not in his right mind. And so uh soon [17:48] afterwards [17:50] a very young man, a boy really came to [17:52] power, King Hussein, [17:55] um, and and managed unbelievably [17:59] to to rule over Jordan for more than 40 [18:02] years. He came in at the last stages of [18:05] the Truman administration and he died of [18:07] cancer, still rather young, uh, in uh, [18:11] during the the late years of the Clinton [18:14] administration. That should gives you [18:16] give you a sense of of of the of this uh [18:20] man and his achievement. Uh in a in a [18:23] poor country besieged by radical regimes [18:26] like Syria after after 1958 is actually [18:31] part of Egypt. Iraq falls into the hands [18:35] of murderous radicals who butchered the [18:37] Hasheite family in 1958. uh his the [18:41] Saudis hate him because they conquered [18:44] the hij from his his greatgrandfather [18:48] from the Sharif Hussein and they will [18:50] never forgive the Hashemites what they [18:52] did to the Hashemites if if you know how [18:54] that works. And so the he's besieged [18:57] from all over [19:00] uh by friendly Arab countries. Uh he [19:04] used to say to his Israeli [19:05] interlocutors, you know, you are lucky [19:07] you have enemies. I am surrounded by [19:10] friends. [19:12] Uh, King Hussein used to and as of 1963 [19:15] onwards he established his own channel [19:19] of communication with the Israeli [19:20] government. [19:22] Sadly, in 1967, he could not resist the [19:26] pressure to be drawn into the war. I've [19:29] heard speculation that maybe he wanted [19:31] the war in order to get rid of all these [19:33] Palestinians who were becoming a [19:35] nuisance. I think that's a a conspiracy [19:38] theory, but he certainly could not [19:40] resist the pressure from NASA and the [19:42] Syrians and others to be drawn into a [19:44] war which he probably uh had a sober [19:49] assessment as to what may happen. But um [19:53] they I have to say both in 48 and in ' [19:56] 67 the Jordanians fought well and fought [20:01] honorably. Um, Israelis paid their [20:05] respects in a sense. Uh, I don't know if [20:07] you know the story in the fiercest [20:10] battle in Jerusalem itself, [20:12] uh, ammunition the battle on ammunition [20:15] hill, [20:16] um, we had quite a number of Israeli [20:19] losses. [20:21] But after the battle was over and a [20:23] makeshift uh burial was made also for [20:27] the Jordanians who fell there and [20:30] Israeli put up a sign that here lie 53 [20:33] brave Jordanian soldiers. I've never [20:36] seen this in our history before or [20:37] after. [20:39] So uh as of as of that point uh um [20:44] Jordan became [20:46] um lost the West Bank and became the [20:50] target of the Palestinian effort to take [20:54] it over and turn it into a base of [20:56] operations. The Palestinians were very [20:58] much impressed and and and and let's say [21:02] influenced by the Vietnamese [21:05] example during those years of the 60s [21:07] and early 70s. And they admire they [21:10] thought that they should turn Jordan [21:13] into Aman into Hanoi so as to conquer [21:17] Saigon that's to say Jerusalem. And so [21:21] they started uh taking [21:24] control of parts of Jordan. Israel began [21:28] raids and operations against their bases [21:31] in Jordan [21:34] and the Jordanians were drawn in uh [21:38] artillery from Jordan and and and [21:41] battles with the IDF. It was a very [21:44] rough period. [21:46] But then the Palestinians just went too [21:49] far and in 1970 and this is the turning [21:53] point for our discussion. In 1970 they [21:56] tried to take over [21:59] and King Hussein had enough and [22:01] basically ordered his military which was [22:04] purely bedwin background not Palestinian [22:08] uh to basically destroy the Palestinian [22:11] organizations on Jordanian soil. The [22:13] Palestinians called it Black September. [22:17] Uh but we remember this as a decisive [22:21] turning point for several reasons. Uh it [22:24] it changed the nature of our [22:25] relationship with Jordan. It changed the [22:27] nature of our relationship with the [22:29] United States because the Israeli [22:31] willingness to intervene and deter the [22:34] Syrians from invading or turn them back [22:38] after they already invaded Jordan in [22:40] retaliation for this this operation [22:44] against the Palestinians. [22:46] Our willingness to to to do this for an [22:49] American ally. Jordan was always an [22:52] American ally. The Hashelites were [22:55] British allies and then they became [22:56] American allies. Our willingness to do [22:59] so, to save uh and secure an Arab ally [23:04] of the West earned us the respect and [23:08] the and the uh uh uh let's say [23:11] partnership of the Nixon administration, [23:14] Henry Kissinger and it made a profound [23:18] difference from then onwards. [23:22] Since 1970, we've never fought the [23:24] Jordanians. [23:26] Not again. [23:28] Moreover, in 1973, it was King Hussein [23:32] who came to warn gold mayor that the [23:34] Syrians are up to no good. [23:37] I wish she listened. She didn't fully [23:40] comprehend the danger that he was [23:42] describing. He did not he was not fully [23:46] aware of what the Egyptians were up to. [23:48] But the Syrians, his northern neighbors [23:50] in he knew and he felt and he he sensed [23:53] that something is is going in the wrong [23:56] direction. He came to warn us. That's a [24:00] remarkable story. It it is being [24:03] mentioned nowadays again because there [24:06] are reports of whether or not Israel was [24:09] warned in 23 by various Arab leaders. [24:13] But in the case of King Hussein, we know [24:15] this for certain. uh a byproduct uh I [24:19] don't go without go without going into [24:21] too much detail. One of the byproducts [24:23] of this warning was that we did beef up [24:26] the northern front and and uh which [24:29] probably saved us from a complete [24:31] collapse on the Golan. So from then on [24:35] it was a friendly relationship but as [24:39] I'm fond of saying uh placed in the most [24:43] in the densest area of the Middle East [24:45] under the table. We met we talked [24:49] King Hussein reportedly used to sit in [24:52] the streets of Tel Aviv and Ogle the [24:54] girls in disguise [24:57] but it was kept secret. It was only [25:00] after 93, after the Oslo agreements made [25:03] it legit, that Jordan came out into the [25:06] open. They had to because in 1999 [25:11] during the Gulf War, Jordan was obliged [25:14] under immense Iraqi pressure to side [25:17] with Saddam Hussein against the other [25:20] Arabs. And so it was in the doghouse in [25:23] in Washington obviously for being on the [25:26] wrong side. and Israel was actually [25:28] helpful in bringing Jordan back into [25:32] America's favor and and part of it was [25:36] this Jordanian decision to come into the [25:38] open and create a peace treat and sign a [25:41] peace treaty with Israel in 1994 which [25:44] has held since then. [25:47] Having said all this, the relationship [25:50] has its ups and downs. Uh on Jerusalem, [25:56] the Jordan Israel and Jordan share an [25:59] interest that it should not fall into [26:01] Palestinian hands. Axabos which is the [26:04] last vestage of Hasheite authority in [26:08] the sense that the Jordanian wak under [26:11] the terms of the priest treaty the [26:13] Jordanian uh uh uh ministry of religious [26:17] affairs so to speak manages the affairs [26:21] of the temple mount for Muslims uh uh [26:24] under Israeli sovereignty and basically [26:27] this hold this 10 years hold on on one [26:30] the last remaining holy place. The [26:33] others two having other two having been [26:35] taken from them by the Saudi is [26:37] important to the Jordanians and and the [26:40] peace treaty secures this. We have a [26:43] mutual interest against Islamist [26:45] terrorism, against Palestinian [26:47] terrorism, against Iranian subversion. [26:51] The Jordanians were of help in shooting [26:54] down some of what the Iranians have been [26:56] throwing at us in 24 25 and the last [27:00] conflict. We are trying to help when the [27:03] they are being attacked. But there are [27:05] tensions radi radical Israeli voices uh [27:10] trouble the Jordanians in terms of what [27:12] they want to do on the temple mount. [27:16] Um the Jordanians cannot ignore the [27:19] broad sentiment in the Arab world [27:22] and uh therefore there are tensions. [27:26] But having said all this, it is one the [27:29] most side by side with Egypt. It's the [27:32] most important relationship we have with [27:34] the Arab world. [27:36] We have [27:38] um a fantastic breakthrough with the [27:42] United Arab Emirates, but Jordan has our [27:44] longest border and the relationship must [27:47] be sustained and maintained and we [27:50] should avoid a friction as best we can. [27:55] questions. [27:57] >> Thank you so much, Iran. That was such a [27:59] thorough uh summary of the of a very [28:01] complicated history and uh I appreciate [28:04] you going through all that. We do have [28:06] just a a couple minutes left. I'm going [28:08] to uh ask a couple of the questions that [28:10] the audience has posed. Um there's a a [28:13] British international lawyer who was at [28:15] Oxford with King Abdullah and taught the [28:17] first university course there on Israel [28:19] Jordanian legal relations who was asked [28:21] as King Abdullah's heir is half [28:24] Palestinian and has been very critical [28:25] of Israel is there a possibility that he [28:28] will abandon their peace treaty most of [28:30] the Jordanian population currently wants [28:32] this and a a different person also asked [28:34] about um the population of Jordan being [28:38] uh 70% Palestine Palestinian Inian, [28:41] excuse me. Is there anything to that? [28:43] And what does all that mean? [28:46] >> Quite frankly, I think the Palestinians [28:48] in Jordan [28:50] know what has befallen their brethren on [28:53] on the other side of the river because [28:56] of Hamas and in the case of those who [28:58] live in the West Bank because of the [29:00] corruption and dysfunction of the [29:02] Palestinian Authority. And how eager are [29:05] they to actually go the same way? I I I [29:09] don't know, but I think that their uh [29:13] dominant elements, the prosper [29:16] prosperous, relatively prosperous middle [29:18] class of Palestinians in Jordan have no [29:21] wish to see their own life lives going [29:25] down the same sinkhole and uh and uh had [29:28] had they been more uh active, things [29:32] could have been different. But we don't [29:34] see this. Uh well there there are [29:38] boycots of uh Israeli lawyers and in [29:42] business and so on but the Jordanian [29:44] government lives uh by Israeli help when [29:47] it comes to water. It has uh been [29:51] willing to walk work with the Emirates [29:53] in Israel on on energy. uh we ultimately [29:58] have so much interest in common that I [30:00] don't think that uh the young prince [30:03] when he ever comes to power uh would [30:06] would uh change course. [30:09] Uh so so I wanted to pose a question to [30:11] you as I'd love to hear your thoughts on [30:12] the possible impact of the Mecca [30:14] agreement which um was a topic of an MAF [30:17] podcast about a month ago and you wrote [30:19] in a recent article that uh quote closer [30:22] relations between Jordan and the regime [30:23] in Damascus could also lead to growing [30:25] Turkish influence as part of the Mecca's [30:28] efforts to expand the circle of [30:30] participating Sunni states. So um is [30:33] there a chance that Jordan would slip [30:35] into a Turkish alliance? [30:37] Well, I think the the the danger was [30:40] there because the Jordanians were [30:44] let's say trying to be friendly with the [30:47] new regime in Damascus. But the recent [30:51] meeting and the encouraging thing is [30:53] that the recent meeting in the Emirates [30:56] brought again the traditional elements [30:59] of the camp of stability in the region, [31:01] Israel included, [31:03] um in a way that indicated that um the [31:06] the old concerns about Islamist [31:08] terrorism and Islamist subversion still [31:12] override the uh the [31:15] let's say temptations of the Turkish [31:17] connection. So Saudi the Saudis came and [31:21] the Amiratis hosted and the Jordanis and [31:24] the Egyptians were there. Uh the [31:26] Moroccans the and and the prime minister [31:29] of Israel happened to be there on the [31:30] same day. This is not uh uh this is [31:33] quite [31:34] >> we lost your sound. [31:37] What? [31:48] >> I can't hear you. [31:50] >> Okay, I can hear you now. We lost your [31:52] sound, I think. [31:53] >> Okay, I said [31:54] >> could be my end. [31:56] >> Okay, the Jordanians were there. Uh, [32:00] interestingly enough, the Egyptians, the [32:02] Moroccans were on very close terms with [32:04] Israel. I think the the the uh Houthi [32:08] achievements on the ground were a wakeup [32:10] call and and and basically indicating [32:14] that the Turkish fantasy uh does not [32:17] deliver for Jordan or for Saudi Arabia. [32:20] So that I think could could be a turning [32:23] point. We don't know yet. Let's put it [32:25] like this. [32:27] Uh, someone asked whether it would [32:30] benefit Israel to acknowledge and [32:32] promote that Jordan was created in 1922 [32:35] to be the Arab state. Um, and that their [32:40] their point being that Israel doesn't [32:42] really make that um, distinction. [32:47] >> Well, some people believe in this [32:50] notion. You know, Jordan is Palestine, [32:52] therefore Palestine is not Palestine. [32:55] um it will not solve our problem uh [32:58] because it will whatever happens it will [33:01] not change the situation on the ground [33:03] where Palestinian people live. Um and um [33:09] it could help and some Israelis make [33:12] that argument if the Jordanians would be [33:15] more willing to bring their governance [33:18] which is far more effective uh into uh [33:22] uh parts of the West Bank where the [33:25] Palestinian Authority is fairly [33:27] dysfunctional. This idea has been [33:29] recently promoted by somebody on the [33:31] clearly on the Israeli center right. [33:36] Um I think the Jordanians would be very [33:39] reluctant right now to get involved. [33:41] They have enough trouble on their hands [33:43] as it is managing in a rough very rough [33:46] neighborhood. But uh the the idea [33:50] basically uh that uh you know by [33:54] declaring that Jordan is Palestine we [33:56] resolve we the Palestinian problem uh I [33:59] think belongs to uh to the realm of of [34:02] fantasy unfortunately. [34:05] Um, so I also wanted to hear your [34:07] thoughts on any threat that Hamas may [34:10] pose to Jordan, whether from Judea and [34:11] Samaria or otherwise. And is the kingdom [34:15] concerned about Hamas from the [34:17] standpoint of regional stability [34:19] generally? Is it concerned about a [34:20] poorest border between what you know is [34:24] known as the West Bank and and Jordan? [34:27] Um, and you had stated in an article, [34:30] I'm going to quote you, tyrron attaches [34:32] particular importance to destabilizing [34:34] Jordan so that it can turn the West Bank [34:35] into a second Gaza. What are your [34:37] thoughts on all of that? [34:39] >> Well, the Jordanians are very, very well [34:41] aware of it, have been aware of this for [34:43] a generation now. [34:45] If Iran wants to penetrate the West Bank [34:48] the way they've been able to penetrate [34:50] Gaza through the political void that [34:54] existed in Sinai for many years uh [34:57] because the Egyptians couldn't care less [34:59] about what was going on in Sinai [35:01] unfortunately uh they need to [35:03] destabilize the Jordanian regime but the [35:05] Jordanian regime is not easily [35:07] destabilized. They have a very effective [35:09] security establishment. They have [35:10] failures from time to time. We had [35:13] terrorist attacks uh by deranged [35:16] individuals and dangerous individuals [35:17] coming across the border. Uh but at the [35:21] end of the day they have been very very [35:24] effective and if you go across the [35:26] border you see that their their [35:28] gunpoints are pointed inwards to prevent [35:31] any such penetration from Jordan into [35:34] Israel. Um they know the consequences. [35:37] They don't have any wish to see a return [35:40] to the crazy 70s. [35:42] or or 60s, sorry. The one point is I [35:46] think that in their heart of hearts, [35:50] although I you know they they will never [35:52] say so, they prefer Israel to stay on [35:56] the banks of the Jordan on the Jordan [35:58] River that the Jordan Valley should [36:01] remain under Israeli security control. [36:04] Sovereignty is an open question, but [36:07] security control must remain Israeli for [36:09] Jordan to be safe and not to become a [36:13] very inviting target for [36:16] destabilization. [36:18] Thank you so much. Unfortunately, we [36:20] have run out of time. We've kept [36:22] everybody over a little bit, but what a [36:24] what a thorough uh background on on the [36:27] relationship and and I appreciate you [36:29] joining us, Iron. We'll have to have you [36:31] back in the future to discuss this as [36:32] the things develop in the region. Um, [36:35] thank you to everybody for joining us [36:36] this afternoon. I hope you can join us [36:38] on Wednesday at 3 PM with uh Ashley [36:40] Perry for Israel Insider. And again, [36:43] Aron, thank you for for joining. You're [36:45] very welcome.
