Transcript [00:00] We find ourselves in a situation where [00:01] the Iranians have been able to erode our [00:04] regional presence, tie us up in a [00:06] stalemate that distracts us and hurts [00:08] our strategic leverage with other [00:10] conflicts and other interests around the [00:11] world, whether it's Ukraine or China, [00:14] and that has passed on significant costs [00:17] to the American people in terms of our [00:20] economic position. And it's very clear [00:22] that the war has not served our [00:24] interests and that we find ourselves [00:26] unable to actually get to a diplomatic [00:28] outcome, which is probably the only [00:30] solution here. [00:32] >> Iranians are digging in their heels [00:33] because they see in two years time that [00:35] President Trump is leaving office. They [00:38] think a Democrat's going to take the [00:39] White House and a Democrat's going to [00:41] reflect the sort of conventional wisdom [00:43] that you're hearing and that is that we [00:46] are not going to use military force. [00:47] We're not going to continue to impose [00:49] maximum pressure. We're going to seek [00:52] diplomacy and we're going to seek some [00:53] kind of deal. And if we do, we'll [00:55] probably give you domestic enrichment [00:56] and we'll kick the can down the road [00:58] hoping that this can doesn't explode uh [01:02] into an atomic weapon. [01:18] This is the moment to send young Jewish [01:20] adults on a birthright trip to Israel. [01:23] Not next year, now. Because after 3 [01:26] years of misinformation, reality needs [01:29] to speak for itself. Over the past 25 [01:32] years, Birthright has sent more than [01:34] 900,000 young Jews to Israel. They come [01:37] back more confident, more connected to [01:39] each other and to Israel. They go on to [01:42] build Jewish families, lead our [01:44] communities, and feel part of a [01:45] 4,000-year Jewish history [music] that [01:48] belongs to them. Birthright's new goal [01:51] is to send another 200,000 young adults [01:54] to Israel by 2029. But it takes people [01:57] like you to make [music] that happen. To [01:59] help shape that future, go to one [02:02] tripverthing.com. [02:06] >> Suzanne Maloney, Mark Dubitz, welcome to [02:09] Call Me Back. [02:10] >> Thank you, Dan. Wonderful to be with you [02:11] and wonderful to be with Suzanne. [02:14] >> I say the same. Thanks so much for [02:16] having me. [02:17] >> So Suzanne, this is your maiden voyage [02:19] on Call Me Back. So you will get the [02:21] first word. Um I want to start with what [02:23] happened in the last 24 hours. The [02:25] Houthis, we understand according to [02:28] reports, the Houthis struck Riad's [02:30] international airport, killing 12 people [02:32] and wounding more than 300. As of now, [02:35] according to reports, the airport is [02:37] shut down. Um, I just want to just [02:40] because this this news is both tragic, [02:42] seems like a big event and is a snapshot [02:45] of this exact discussion we're having. [02:46] So, what does this attack tell us about [02:49] the state of the Iran war and the [02:51] ability of Iran and its regional allies [02:54] to continue inflicting damage? [02:56] >> Thanks, Dan. I think it's a great place [02:58] to start because I think it really [02:59] illustrates how what was intended to be [03:01] a fairly short-lived war taking out the [03:04] regime and leading to some kind of [03:06] change in Thran has actually led to a [03:08] situation in which the Iranian regime [03:10] remains intact. It may by some standards [03:14] be in a stronger position today than it [03:16] was on February 28th. And the war has [03:19] breathed new life into its proxy network [03:21] which had been decimated in the Israeli [03:23] and American campaigns in the region [03:25] after October 7th. And it has also led [03:28] to a kind of metastasizing conflict. um [03:31] despite our efforts to try to contain [03:33] the damage, we're now seeing that the [03:36] Gulf state's vulnerability remains high [03:39] and that even a a force as a sort of um [03:43] limited and and small scale as the [03:45] Houthis can strike fear in the heart of [03:48] travelers of of Saudi leaders who are [03:51] trying to transition their economy from [03:53] reliance on oil to one in which they are [03:56] a hub for tourism, for finance, for [03:59] technology and A strike at the airport [04:02] will make it very difficult um and and [04:05] raise the risk premium for travel to the [04:07] region as a whole. [04:08] >> Suzanne, President Trump is saying he's [04:10] considering American strikes against the [04:12] Houthis in response. [04:14] Would that be a necessary escalation or [04:16] would it risk drawing the United States [04:19] into an even wider conflict at this [04:21] point? [04:22] >> Well, I think it puts the president on [04:23] the back foot. He rejected a request [04:26] from Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin [04:28] Salman to do just that, enter the war [04:31] against the Houthis with air strikes [04:34] last month. And that was in some [04:36] respects kind of a humiliating passage [04:38] in this entire relationship between the [04:41] United States and his allies in the [04:42] region. If the president were to jump in [04:45] at this point in time, obviously only [04:47] weeks away from midterm elections, he [04:49] does risk reinforcing Americans concerns [04:52] about not just the extent to which we're [04:54] in another forever war, but also the the [04:58] the impact on their pocketbooks in terms [05:00] of gasoline prices. And that's not an [05:02] optic that the president, I suspect, [05:04] would like to have. But at this point in [05:06] time, given the death toll, given the [05:08] persistence now of over a week of [05:10] strikes uh that have hit civilian air [05:13] traffic in Saudi Arabia, uh I I would [05:16] not be surprised if in fact the United [05:18] States did take action at this time. So [05:21] Mark, you argue that Iran played its [05:24] strongest card already trying to close [05:27] the straight of Hormuz and that [05:29] ultimately in that test Iran lost that [05:31] America has effectively turned Iran's [05:33] greatest economic weapon against it [05:35] through through the US blockade while [05:39] golf exports have gradually not fully [05:42] but gradually recovered. So I just want [05:44] you to walk through that argument. [05:46] What's changed in recent weeks that [05:48] makes you confident America is winning [05:51] this battle? [05:52] >> Well, Dan, what's changed is that [05:53] Admiral Cooper, the Sangcom commander, [05:55] and the US military have effectively [05:56] taken back hormuse from the Iranians, [05:59] and we're back to almost pre-war levels [06:01] of exports of oil and condensates out of [06:04] that region. And I think it's very [06:06] important to ask this question about who [06:08] is winning by looking at who started the [06:10] war 47 years ago. The United States has [06:13] been the target of Iranian terror and [06:16] violence as has the region for 47 years. [06:19] And I think the war didn't begin on [06:20] February 28th. It began in 1979. But [06:24] this current round of the war began last [06:26] June. And so Midnight Hammer and Epic [06:29] Fury, which are the names for the US [06:31] operations, are two wars against the [06:34] Islamic Republic of Iran that is, in [06:35] Suzanne's words, have decimated its [06:37] proxy network. It severely degraded its [06:40] nuclear program. They were on the one [06:42] yard line. They've been pushed back [06:43] significantly. Severely degraded its [06:46] missile production capability. Those [06:47] ballistic missiles represented a [06:49] significant threat to Israel, to the [06:50] region, and ultimately an ICBM program [06:53] to the United States of America. And its [06:55] economy is collapsing. And the Houthies, [06:58] I think, are actually a good example of [06:59] the case that I would make. It's the [07:01] last potent terror proxy that the [07:03] Iranians have to deploy. So they played [07:06] the Hormuz card, they lost it. They want [07:09] to play the nuclear card. They still may [07:10] play it and we should talk about it on [07:12] this podcast. And now they're playing [07:14] the Houthi card. And of course, it is [07:16] it's a serious problem. The Houthis are [07:18] a dangerous terrorist organization. And [07:21] now we have the United States, the [07:22] Israelis, the Saudis, and the Amiradis [07:25] together in a coalition to try and push [07:27] back against this Houthi threat. But [07:29] Mark, just this past week with renewed [07:32] Iranian attacks, I've seen reports that [07:34] that these attacks reportedly push oil [07:36] shipments way down, like below below [07:39] pre-war levels, doesn't that suggest [07:42] Iran still has considerable leverage [07:44] here? [07:45] >> Well, I think you need to look at [07:46] rolling 7-day averages, 14-day averages, [07:48] month averages, right? I think the the [07:50] trajectory is is positive and you're [07:52] going to see twists and turns uh in this [07:55] campaign, but I think they they [07:57] certainly have leverage. I mean, they [07:58] still have ballistic missiles. They [07:59] still have drones. And as Suzanne said, [08:01] they're still around. But being around [08:03] and surviving doesn't mean that they're [08:04] strategically winning. They're playing [08:06] their last cards at a time where the [08:10] regime is very much on its backfoot. Its [08:12] economy is collapsing. It's terrified [08:15] that millions of Iranians are going to [08:16] return back to the streets and its [08:18] nuclear program has been severely [08:20] degraded. So that was ultimately where I [08:23] would put the ledger. We've sharply [08:25] reduced its war making capability. [08:27] sharply reduced that nuclear threat that [08:29] so many of us were worried about. [08:31] Sharply reduced its ballistic missile [08:33] production capability. We've effectively [08:35] taken Hormuz away from the Iranians. [08:37] It's not over, but we've diminished [08:39] their leverage. And now we're now the [08:42] battle shifts to the Babal Mandup and [08:44] the Red Sea where the Houthis are still [08:46] capable of creating havoc. And now this [08:49] co coalition of the good needs to deal [08:51] with this Houthi threat as the last [08:53] remaining Iranian proxy threat that has [08:56] any kind of severe implications for the [08:59] United States and the region. [09:01] >> Um Suzanne Mark has argued and and not [09:05] just Mark I mean I I hear this a lot [09:07] that that time is really now working [09:09] against Thran. The Islamic Republic's [09:11] economy is deteriorating. its oil [09:13] revenues are under pressure and the [09:15] regime faces the possibility of, [09:19] you know, renewed domestic unrest. I [09:20] don't know if it'll be at the scale of [09:22] what it was, you know, kind of January [09:24] uh of this year, but, you know, it could [09:27] easily hit that or some maybe even [09:29] something more severe. So, it seems to [09:31] me you see the balance of power [09:33] differently. So why what what makes you [09:35] think Iran can withstand all this [09:38] pressure we're talking about longer than [09:41] Washington and other actors outside Iran [09:44] and inside Iran can sustain it? [09:46] >> It's a great question and obviously [09:47] we're all trying to see through the [09:50] glass darkly with respect to what's [09:51] happening inside Iran. But I would point [09:53] out this that we have managed to [09:55] reconstitute [09:57] um near pre-war levels of oil exports. [10:00] We have not managed to reconstitute near [10:03] pre-war levels of exports of LG, for [10:05] example. And even the oil that we we are [10:09] uh helping to guide out of the Gulf, it [10:11] costs an awful lot more to do it this [10:13] way. It costs a lot more for the [10:15] companies, for the producing countries [10:18] and for the American consumer and [10:20] consumers around the world because it [10:22] effectively requires ship to- ship [10:24] transfers. The Iranians have begun to [10:27] apparently improve their ability to [10:28] target the passage through uh dark of [10:31] night and we're seeing constraints on uh [10:34] super tankers because of the the [10:36] necessity of essentially using multiple [10:39] ships for every uh export cargo that [10:42] comes out of the straight of Hormuz. So [10:44] I would not say that we are done with [10:46] the war with respect to the status of [10:49] the straight of hormos. It's also [10:50] requiring about onethird of the deployed [10:52] assets of the American Navy to maintain [10:55] this. How long is that sustainable? We [10:57] do have other challenges around the [10:59] world. And it has also required steps, [11:01] frankly, that are um inconceivable um [11:04] from an American president. For example, [11:06] the decision in the past days by [11:09] President Trump to accept to request and [11:11] then accept uh imports of diesel fuel [11:15] from Russia in contravention of standing [11:17] US sanctions in the latest sanctions [11:19] package that he himself has signed. And [11:22] so we're at a point where we're taking [11:24] steps that are morally and strategically [11:27] disastrous. Uh and that again is just [11:30] one microcosm of the larger erosion of [11:33] American status in the world and [11:34] American military readiness that this [11:37] war has has uh ensued for the United [11:40] States and for our relationships and [11:42] credibility around the world. The [11:44] Iranians have been able to hold out. [11:47] They may not be able to hold out [11:48] indefinitely. We do know that of course [11:50] the blockade is having significant [11:52] economic pressure on Iran. But I will [11:55] say having studied the Iranian economy [11:57] and having watched repeated invocations [12:00] of maximum pressure and steps that the [12:04] United States takes that it assumes will [12:06] be a knockout blow to the Iranian [12:07] economy. That has not happened in the [12:10] past. And I would suspect that we're [12:12] going to see our own vulnerability to [12:14] the rising price of fuel uh as a [12:17] significant constraint on our ability to [12:19] sustain this kind of arrangement that is [12:22] enabling some of the oil to come out at [12:24] present. The final point I just want to [12:26] make is about the Iranian people and [12:28] there I think the costs of this war, the [12:31] choice to go to war on February 28th are [12:34] absolutely catastrophic. Iranians risk [12:37] their lives and paid an enormous price [12:39] back in late December and early January. [12:42] Human rights organizations have [12:43] documented as many as 7,000 who were [12:46] killed by the regime when they protested [12:48] against it at that time. Real numbers [12:51] are probably quite larger than that. But [12:53] fundamentally, when the president [12:55] tweeted that the United States would [12:57] come to the rescue of the Iranian [12:58] people, he did just the opposite. This [13:01] war has had catastrophic implications [13:04] for the Iranian economy and the people [13:06] who are paying the price are not those [13:08] who are in power is ordinary Iranians [13:10] who are going without food, who are [13:12] going without medicine as a result of [13:14] this campaign. And let me tell you, I've [13:16] spent time in Iran and I they remember [13:19] American misdeeds very clearly. If you [13:23] think that the Mosedc affair lives large [13:25] in the mindsets of Iranians, I can tell [13:28] you that this is a betrayal on a on an [13:31] order of magnitude larger than that. To [13:33] promise to come to their rescue and to [13:35] uh leave them in a state where they are [13:38] at the behest of a regime which has [13:40] treated them with extreme cruelty and [13:43] cut off from the world. This is an [13:46] incredible betrayal by the United [13:47] States. [13:48] So Mark, you know, I watched those [13:50] briefings by by Admiral Cooper and [13:52] they're impressive uh in terms of the [13:55] stickuitedness of the US military of [13:57] Central Command in terms of what it's [13:58] accomplished against virtually all the [14:02] you know expert opinion that was out [14:03] there, not you know the consensus uh [14:05] expert opinion in terms of what could be [14:07] accomplished, how the the US could [14:08] regain its strategic footing in the [14:10] straight. And then you listen to [14:12] Suzanne, she paints a picture of where [14:14] the Iranian people are at. And that that [14:17] is obviously not a picture that's that's [14:19] we often see in those military briefings [14:22] from from our own military. What is your [14:24] response to what Suzanne is saying? [14:25] >> So, a few things. I I I think on the [14:27] Iranian people, look, it's it's [14:28] difficult for us to know, but there [14:30] certainly seemed to be very strong [14:31] support for US and Israeli military [14:34] operations against the regime in Iran at [14:35] the time. And when President Trump said [14:37] help is on its way, I think the Iranian [14:39] people really did expect that there [14:41] would be serious help. Now, to be fair [14:43] to President Trump, a month later, he [14:45] launched military operations against the [14:48] regime and between the Israelis and the [14:49] Americans killed Ali Kamina, top IRGC, [14:53] Ministry of Intelligence officials, took [14:55] out, you know, thousands of IRGC in [14:57] besieged, took out the very people that [14:58] had been brutalizing the Iranian people. [15:00] I think the missing element of the [15:02] president's strategy, I've said this [15:03] time and time again, is that if you do [15:05] epic fury, which is the military [15:06] campaign, if you do economic fury, which [15:09] is the maximum economic squeeze, we [15:12] should be doing operation people's fury. [15:13] We should be providing significant [15:15] support to the Iranian people. So when [15:18] they come back to the streets, and I [15:19] have no doubt they will be coming back [15:20] to the streets again, they're not coming [15:22] back alone. We've armed them. We [15:24] supported them. We financed them. We [15:26] provided them with communication devices [15:27] so that they can communicate, mobilize, [15:30] and and maybe these protests will be [15:31] even bigger this time than they were [15:33] last time. But I agree with Suzanne. I [15:34] mean, the the economic fury, the brunt [15:37] of economic fury is fallen on the [15:39] average Iranian. And the question for us [15:41] is, is economic pressure enough to break [15:45] this regime? I also think that the the [15:48] more important question from a US [15:49] foreign policy perspective is what are [15:51] the alternatives? You know, Suzanne and [15:52] I have known each other many years. [15:54] We've been debating Iran for many, many [15:55] years. Um, the other alternatives that [15:58] Democratic administrations chose, one [16:01] was the Obama JCPOA nuclear deal. And [16:04] the other one was President Biden's [16:05] attempt to get back into an Iran deal. [16:08] And in both cases, I think the current [16:10] situation is far better than we would [16:12] have ended up under both those [16:14] trajectories. The JCPOA had [16:16] restrictions, temporary restrictions, [16:18] which were good. And most of those [16:20] restrictions would go away actually [16:22] starting right about now, Dan, 2025, [16:24] 2026. And in 2030, all of the nuclear [16:27] restrictions that were relevant would go [16:28] away. And Iran would take patient [16:30] pathways to nuclear weapons with a [16:32] massive nuclear infrastructure, [16:33] unlimited enrichment capabilities, and [16:36] it would have a missile arsenal and a [16:38] missile shield under which it would have [16:41] immunity against American and Israeli [16:43] attacks. It also would have permanent [16:45] control over Hammuz. I mean, Ali Kam [16:47] wanted to take control of Hermuz, but [16:49] not at at Iran's weakest point the way [16:51] Moraba Kam took it. But when Iran had [16:54] nuclear weapons, ICBMs, [16:56] tens of thousands of ballistic missiles, [16:58] hundreds of thousands of drones, a [16:59] Chinese Russianbuilt military, and an [17:01] economic infrastructure that could [17:03] withstand US sanctions. That's what he [17:05] wanted to take and he would have taken [17:07] it permanently. [17:09] We fortunately killed him and then [17:12] Moshab his son played the hormuse card [17:15] when Iran was at its weakest. It didn't [17:17] have nuclear weapons. It didn't have [17:18] 10,000 ballistic missiles. It didn't [17:21] have hundreds of thousands of drones and [17:22] its economy is is collapsing. The the [17:24] second big mistake of course is that [17:27] President President Biden after [17:29] President Trump had withdrawn from the [17:30] deal put on maximum pressure. And by the [17:32] way, the Iranians didn't escalate their [17:33] nuclear program under Trump because they [17:35] were afraid of Trump. They waited until [17:37] Biden's election and then most of Iran's [17:39] nuclear expansion occurred when [17:41] President Biden was in office. It's not [17:42] a partisan point. It's just a factual [17:44] point. And it I think it demonstrates [17:46] that when you're evaluating where we are [17:48] today, you need to compare it to the [17:51] alternatives. And the alternatives would [17:53] would have given Iran nuclear weapons, a [17:55] powerful economy, terror proxies, by the [17:58] way, that that we saw their face on [18:00] October 7th. And I think with nuclear [18:02] weapons and ballistic missiles, the [18:04] Israelis would never been able to do to [18:07] the terror army, the decimation that [18:09] Suzanne is talking about had Iran had [18:11] that kind of potent capability. [18:13] >> Suzanne, the best, you know, maybe the [18:16] best place to to I don't know about [18:17] settle the question, but try to address [18:19] the question of who has the leverage is [18:23] by trying to understand the state of [18:24] negotiations. So Iran is negotiating [18:27] under significant pressure. In late se [18:29] September, Thrron proposed reopening the [18:33] straight of Hormuz in exchange for [18:34] sanctions relief, unblocking its ports, [18:37] and releasing frozen assets. Washington [18:40] rejected those terms and Iran rejected [18:43] an American counter proposal in early [18:45] October. I'm just trying to like kind of [18:47] set up where we are right now or how we [18:49] got here. So, from your perspective, why [18:51] have the negotiations reached a [18:54] stalemate? I guess that's my first [18:56] question for you and then I have another [18:57] one. I think the negotiations have [18:59] stalemated because ultimately the [19:01] Iranians aren't prepared to give what [19:03] the United States wants and the United [19:05] States is not prepared to give what the [19:06] Iranians want. The Iranians want some [19:08] kind of sanctions relief, meaningful, [19:10] durable sanctions relief, [19:12] in injection of of opportunity back into [19:15] their economy. Uh and the United States [19:18] from what I understand wants uh you know [19:20] some sort of a um grandiose nuclear [19:23] bargain um that would forwear any [19:27] possible nuclear industry within Iran [19:30] and that is something that the regime [19:31] has made very clear for decades now that [19:34] it is not prepared to countenance and so [19:36] even after an intense military campaign [19:38] and the imposition of even more intense [19:41] economic pressure we haven't yet seen [19:44] the Iranians willing to agree to the [19:46] term terms that the president wants. And [19:47] I think this gets back to the point that [19:49] Mark made about the decision in 2018 by [19:53] President Trump during his first term to [19:55] walk away from the JCPOA. The JCPA was [19:58] imperfect. Uh obviously, it was limited [20:01] to only addressing the nuclear program, [20:02] as Mark noted, not the proxies, the [20:04] missiles, and the other aspects that [20:06] Iran uses to threaten its neighbors and [20:08] its own people. But what it did do is at [20:10] least put a constraint on that for a [20:12] period of time. And by the United States [20:14] walking away from the deal, the the [20:16] Iranians chose to do the same and over [20:19] time, as Mark noted, built a an [20:21] industrial nuclear program that was very [20:24] advanced, that was producing [20:26] highlyenriched uranium and not re [20:28] removing its stockpiles of lowenriched [20:30] uranium. They were had introduced [20:32] advanced centrifuges. They were doing [20:34] many things that the deal would not have [20:36] allowed them to do. That put us in a [20:38] position where military action was one [20:40] of the only alternatives. And I think [20:42] the Operation Midnight Hammer, as Mark [20:45] noted, was successful in setting back [20:48] the Iranian nuclear program in a [20:50] historic way. For the first time in [20:52] nearly two decades, the Iranians weren't [20:54] enriching uranium. If we were debating [20:56] this issue in the aftermath of that war, [20:58] I would have said that in fact the use [21:00] of military force was necessary and [21:03] effective. I think the distinction is in [21:05] the aftermath of this war, we find [21:07] ourselves in a situation where the [21:09] Iranians have been able to erode our [21:11] regional presence, tie us up in a [21:13] stalemate that distracts us and hurts [21:15] our strategic leverage with other [21:17] conflicts and other interests around the [21:18] world, whether it's Ukraine or China, [21:21] and that has passed on significant costs [21:24] to the American people in terms of our [21:27] economic position. And over time, that [21:30] is going to be a critical issue here. So [21:33] I think on balance it's very clear that [21:35] the war has not served our interests and [21:38] that we find ourselves unable to [21:40] actually get to a diplomatic outcome [21:42] which is probably the only solution [21:44] here. [21:45] >> Mark your how do you respond? Yeah, I [21:47] mean I think the reason Dan wanted an [21:49] impass is one fundamental issue and [21:50] Susanna has said it's called domestic [21:52] enrichment of uranium, right? The the [21:55] Iranians won that in the JCPOA from [21:57] Obama and the fatal flaw of the [21:59] agreement were not just restrictions [22:01] that sunset over time where all these [22:03] restrictions on advanced centrifuges and [22:04] everything else go away, but that the [22:06] Iranians had the ability to continue to [22:08] enrich uranium, which is the key file [22:10] material you need for nuclear weapons. [22:12] And nobody has denied the Iranians a [22:14] civilian nuclear program. I think the [22:16] Trump administration has said, "We [22:18] understand that if we give you domestic [22:20] enrichment, you're going to build [22:21] nuclear weapons." And that is that is [22:22] the impass that has prevented a [22:25] diplomatic deal. If the Iranians [22:26] tomorrow said, "We're going to have [22:28] civilian nuclear fuel like 23 other [22:30] countries. We'll have a civilian nuclear [22:32] program, no domestic enrichment, no [22:34] plutonium reprocessing," the Trump [22:36] administration would do a deal in a [22:38] Manhattan minute and would give massive [22:40] sanctions relief to to Iran. The [22:42] Iranians are digging in their heels. I [22:44] think they're digging in their heels [22:45] because they see in two years time that [22:47] President Trump is leaving office. I [22:50] think if Trump had another four years, [22:52] the Iranians would have a completely [22:53] different posture. They think a [22:55] Democrat's going to take the White House [22:56] and a Democrat's going to reflect the [22:58] sort of conventional wisdom that you're [23:00] hearing. And that is that we are not [23:02] going to use military force. We're not [23:04] going to continue to impose maximum [23:06] pressure. We're going to seek diplomacy [23:08] and we're going to seek some kind of [23:10] deal. And if we do, we'll probably give [23:11] you domestic enrichment and we'll put [23:13] some temporary restrictions on you the [23:15] way we did in 2015 and we'll kick the [23:17] can down the road hoping that this can [23:19] doesn't explode uh into an atomic [23:22] weapon. So I I think it's very important [23:24] to focus on what the stalemate is. And I [23:27] think it's also very important to [23:28] understand that the current war was very [23:32] much about removing Iran's ballistic [23:34] missile shield. I mean, Suzanne admitted [23:36] that the June war of last year was a [23:38] smashing success in degrading nuclear [23:40] capabilities, but what we haven't zeroed [23:42] in on is the other aspect of Iran's [23:44] deadly capabilities, its ballistic [23:46] missiles, its intercontinental ballistic [23:48] missiles. Ali Kam's plan was to build [23:51] this massive missile shield. When you [23:53] have it, Dan, Israel is not going to [23:55] attack. America's not going to attack. [23:56] The Iranians can then build nuclear [23:58] weapons under this missile shield. The [24:00] second war is about degrading that. [24:02] We've done a I think an excellent job of [24:04] of degrading their ballistic missile [24:06] production capability and I think we've [24:09] paid the price temporarily through [24:11] Hormuz and yet we're now reversing [24:13] Hormuz, taking it back. The American [24:15] economy actually is doing really quite [24:16] well and we paid a price in terms of the [24:19] temporary surge in oil prices in order [24:21] to eliminate one of America's most [24:24] deadly enemies over 47 years and also a [24:27] close ally of of China, Russia and North [24:29] Korea. And in terms of the nuclear [24:32] program, I take your point that they [24:33] were building a conventional capability [24:35] that was a shield to protect any threats [24:39] to its nuclear program. But if what do [24:42] we know now about the state of its [24:44] nuclear program and any path to [24:47] seriously shutting it down? [24:49] >> Well, I think I think there's still [24:50] areas of concern which which are worth [24:52] flagging. And I I think we've talked on [24:54] this show about Pickax Mountain where [24:55] the Iranians are trying to rebuild their [24:57] nuclear capabilities 500 ft underground [25:00] under a mountain. Um a nuclear facility [25:03] that may be immunized against our [25:04] ability to use the massive ordinance [25:06] penetrators that were dropped from the [25:08] B2s in June that destroyed the Ford [25:10] facility. So I know that you know US [25:13] government, military, Israelis are hard [25:15] at work trying to figure out solutions [25:16] for pickaxe mountain. But yeah, let's [25:18] not be under any illusions. The nuclear [25:20] program hasn't been eliminated or [25:22] obliterated as President Trump said. [25:24] It's been severely degraded. It's been [25:26] set back. But Dan, you're a big football [25:27] fan, so you'll appreciate that. Um the [25:31] uh the nuclear program was on the one [25:32] yard line before the war last June. And [25:36] that's not my words, those that's the [25:38] words of the CIA director, John [25:39] Ratcliffe. So they're on the one yard [25:41] line. They they were able to dash to the [25:43] equivalent of 11 bombs worth of [25:45] weaponized uranium. They had a fully [25:47] intact weapons group. A lot of that has [25:49] been degraded, but again, let's not but [25:51] be deluded or naive. They still will [25:54] seek reconstitution, and there's there's [25:56] still a lot of reason to go back in and [25:58] and continue to degrade this this [26:01] capability. [26:02] >> Suzanne, President Trump recently [26:04] announced that the US would not attack [26:07] Iran, at least not attack Iran before [26:10] the midterm elections, the US midterms. [26:13] Now there many have noted including a [26:15] recent piece in Axios that the [26:17] president's public statements on these [26:19] issues often don't match his actions and [26:23] some analysts have said he's trying to [26:25] just you know generate some momentum for [26:27] the for the oil markets with these [26:29] statements. What's your read on his [26:31] announcement and and if there is renewed [26:34] fighting, what do you imagine it look it [26:36] could look like whenever it would [26:38] happen? I think you're exactly right to [26:40] point out that the president's uh [26:42] rhetoric on escalation sometimes belies [26:45] his actions and we've seen more American [26:47] troops being moved into the region and [26:49] other assets. So I think it's um wise to [26:52] presume that we may find ourselves in a [26:55] new round of escalation precipitated [26:56] either by the United States or by the [26:59] Iranians. Uh and and I think both are [27:02] prepared for that and are anticipating [27:04] that we will not find a kind of long [27:06] period of quiet. The Israelis also have [27:09] a vote in this as well, of course, and [27:11] at least the reporting suggests that the [27:12] prime minister would prefer that there [27:14] is no strike uh or escalation by the [27:17] United States prior to Israeli [27:19] elections. But we'll see. Um I think [27:21] that, you know, we are likely to be um [27:24] in some situation of escalation over the [27:27] course of the weeks and months to come [27:28] simply because there doesn't appear to [27:30] be a a real opportunity for a diplomatic [27:33] breakthrough. And that is what, you [27:36] know, we've been talking about over the [27:37] course of of this podcast. Um, and I [27:39] think that is the fundamental challenge [27:41] that the two sides simply don't agree. [27:43] And Mark uh obviously has had a [27:46] long-standing position of critique of [27:48] the JCPOA and the the extent to which [27:51] the Iranians were able to [27:54] retain their ability to enrich uranium. [27:57] But fundamentally the wa decision by [27:59] President Trump to walk away from the [28:00] deal was what enabled the Iranians to [28:03] resume enrichment and expand enrichment [28:05] to the point that they were on that one [28:07] yard line. And so I think we have to be [28:09] very clear about um you know what the [28:12] challenge is. And of course the the most [28:14] generous agreement that any American [28:16] president has ever concluded with the [28:18] Iranian regime was the one that the [28:20] President Trump signed at Versailles in [28:22] June. the memorandum of understanding [28:24] that promised Iran hundreds of billions [28:27] of dollars of economic opportunity as [28:29] well as the removal of key sanctions. [28:31] And so, you know, the fact that they [28:33] didn't trust it um I think was probably [28:36] wise. But fundamentally, if we're going [28:38] to compare the diplomatic achievements [28:40] in terms of managing the Iranian regime, [28:43] it's not clear that this administration [28:45] really has a good theory of the case. [28:47] From what I understand, the the [28:49] negotiators, Mr. WhitF and Mr. Kushner [28:52] believed when they were meeting in [28:54] Islamabad with Iranian officials that [28:56] this might be the start of a grand [28:57] bargain that there might be a new [28:58] relationship between this regime in the [29:00] United States. That doesn't strike me as [29:03] highly realistic. It doesn't strike me [29:05] that we have the right right team with [29:07] the deep technical expertise that would [29:09] actually be needed to produce a [29:12] meaningful agreement with the Iranians. [29:14] And so I think that just means that [29:16] we're likely to continue in this state [29:17] of no peace, no war, and no clarity, no [29:20] certainty, and no confidence in what the [29:24] economic implications of the standoff [29:26] and hormuz are, which is why you see the [29:28] price of oil remaining high and why [29:30] you're going to see all of that play out [29:32] in other parts of the American economy. [29:34] And your your view just Suzanne because [29:37] you know Mark made that the football [29:38] analogy that the program was on the one [29:41] yard line the nuclear program and you [29:42] you basically say you you agree with [29:44] that and you blame the Trump [29:46] administration for that I guess where do [29:50] you think the program stands now? [29:52] >> Well I'm not a football fan so I can't [29:54] really predict tell you one yard line [29:56] versus 10 yard line but it was far more [29:58] advanced than anyone can be comfortable [30:00] with. Um, and I think that what we saw [30:02] with respect to Midnight Hammer is, you [30:05] know, while the president obviously used [30:07] hyperbolic language in describing the [30:09] program as uh as obliterated, um, it was [30:14] the first time in in two decades that [30:16] the Iranians weren't enriching uranium [30:18] and that the world could breathe a sigh [30:19] of relief knowing that the [30:22] highlyenriched uranium was at least [30:24] understood to be buried deep underground [30:26] and that there were eyes on those sites [30:28] at all times. So there wasn't uh you [30:30] know the imminent concern of a sneak [30:32] out. Mark has raised the issue of [30:34] missiles and clearly the Iranians um [30:36] have built an industrial capability [30:38] there as well and that was a a concern [30:41] and a risk certainly for Israel and [30:43] Iran's other neighbors in the region. [30:46] But the way of dealing with that risk in [30:48] terms of a regime change war that didn't [30:50] really have a plan for Iranian response. [30:54] The presumption seems to have been that [30:56] the regime would simply collapse and [30:58] wouldn't be able to mount any kind of [31:00] reasonable defense. Um, that obviously [31:03] didn't prove to be the case. And now [31:04] we're dealing with the failure once [31:07] again in the Middle East of an American [31:09] administration to go into a war without [31:11] a clear exit plan. That has obviously, [31:14] you know, had a huge impact on the [31:17] American people. They're tired of these [31:19] forever wars in the region. And [31:20] President Trump in some respects was [31:22] precient in his early campaigns in [31:25] highlighting that issue, the cost of [31:26] Iraq and Afghanistan for Americans, both [31:29] in terms of our economy and in terms of [31:32] human life. And now we find ourselves in [31:35] yet another one of these wars that [31:37] doesn't appear to have a a near-term end [31:39] state, either diplomatic or military. [31:42] And I think unfortunately it's going to [31:44] it's going to play out at the ballot box [31:46] in the midterms and potentially for the [31:48] 2028 election as well. Mark, you want to [31:50] respond to that? [31:51] >> First of all, I I think that uh [31:53] President Trump, this wasn't a regime [31:54] change war for him. I wish it had been. [31:56] I I I was actually critical of him for [31:58] not pursuing a regime change war. I [31:59] think President Trump made it very [32:00] clear, even though President Trump is [32:03] really disciplined in his rhetoric, that [32:04] this is a war about severely degrading [32:07] Iran's war making capabilities and [32:10] nuclear capabilities. I think the United [32:11] States has achieved that. I think second [32:13] of all, the price that we've paid. I [32:15] mean, again, I want to be careful here [32:17] because there have been 22 US casualties [32:19] and every one of those casualties is a [32:21] tragedy for for families and and and we [32:23] need to mourn our our heroes. But we've [32:26] lost 22 American soldiers in this entire [32:30] war. So to compare it to the forever [32:32] wars of Iraq and Afghanistan and Vietnam [32:34] and others, I think is a a big [32:36] overstatement. In terms of actual [32:38] military capacity, I think we've lost [32:40] something like 81 aircraft, half of [32:42] which were were drones. That's about [32:44] 0.6% of our entire 13,000 [32:48] strong aircraft fleet. Um, again, [32:52] nothing to compare to to previous wars. [32:54] And in terms of the economy, Dan, our [32:55] economy is doing pretty well. I mean, [32:57] yes, oil is up, gasoline is up, but GDP [33:00] numbers, stock market, you know, by all [33:02] accounts, the the US economy has has [33:04] really uh persevered throughout this war [33:08] quite admirably. [33:09] >> But cost of living and inflation. Well, [33:11] well, yes, but I mean, even inflation is [33:13] better under Trump than it was under [33:15] Biden. So, again, and I'm not I'm not [33:17] making any political points. I'm not a [33:19] partisan, and I'm certainly not [33:20] participating in the midterms. The Trump [33:22] administration can make their own [33:23] arguments, but the economic cost for the [33:26] United States has been minimal. It's [33:27] been relatively low in terms of lives [33:30] and uh and and military infrastructure. [33:33] I think on the Iranian side, they got to [33:35] be very worried. And you know, this is [33:37] not just my point. I mean, Mosen Rzai, [33:39] who's one of the top Iranian national [33:41] security figures, who's no shrink and [33:43] violet and certainly is not pro America [33:45] or pro-Israel or pro FDD, was making [33:47] exactly my case just a couple of days [33:49] ago when he said, "We're facing a severe [33:53] crisis." And the crisis is going to [33:55] really hit the ground when the regime [33:59] can no longer pay its security forces, [34:01] right? It if it starts missing payrolls, [34:04] then you got a problem. If you can't pay [34:06] 2.7 million members of the Bas or [34:08] 160,000 members of the RGC, you have a [34:11] problem. And the Iranian regime has [34:13] never faced this kind of economic pain [34:17] before. Not during Trump won, not during [34:19] Obama, certainly not during Bush, not [34:21] even during the Iran Iraq wars. I mean, [34:23] this is severe economic crisis. And the [34:27] question is, is that going to be enough [34:28] to topple the regime? I can't tell you. [34:30] But I can tell you the one thing, and [34:31] I'll end with this. It is always good to [34:33] weaken your enemy. It is always better [34:35] to severely weaken your enemy and it's [34:37] best to your enemy. And in that [34:39] respect, we have severely weakened one [34:41] of our most dangerous enemies. And in [34:43] doing so, and I think this is an [34:44] important point to remember, we've [34:46] eliminated the possibility of a [34:48] multiffront war if China decides to take [34:51] Taiwan. Because if China decides to take [34:53] Taiwan, of course, the Chinese were [34:55] planning for the Islamic Republic to [34:57] launch an offensive war against the [34:59] United States and tie us up in the [35:01] Middle East. The fact that we've [35:02] weakened Iranian capabilities means we [35:04] are stronger in countering China. And [35:07] the fact that we've realized that we'd [35:08] have a munitions problem and are now [35:10] engaged in a massive [35:13] production surge in order to account for [35:16] that I think ultimately is going to put [35:17] us in a stronger position visav China [35:19] than if we had been asleep at the switch [35:21] the way we were before and then are [35:23] found ourselves with a major [35:25] confrontation in the Taiw Taiwan Strait [35:27] and then faced a munitions crisis. [35:29] Better to face a munitions crisis and [35:30] respond to it with respect to Iran and [35:33] face one when you're facing off against [35:34] the Chinese Communist Party and the [35:36] People's Liberation Army in the [35:38] Indoacific. We'll be right back with [35:40] Mark Dubitz and Suzanne Maloney after [35:42] this short message. [35:45] [music] [35:45] >> Hi, it's Gabe Silverstein from the Ark [35:48] Media team. You may know me from [35:50] research by [music] Gabe Silverstein. [35:52] Last summer, I participated in a [35:54] Birthright trip, so I can tell you [35:55] exactly what they mean when they say one [35:58] trip changes everything. Birthright [36:00] didn't just connect [music] me with my [36:01] Israeli brothers and sisters in a [36:03] spiritual and lasting way. Birthright [36:05] gave me a deeper understanding of what [36:07] it means to be a Jew and where I fit [36:09] into the Jewish story. It's incredible [36:11] to me that this organization exists. And [36:13] I know that behind every one of these [36:15] trips are generous people who made it [36:17] happen. People like you. Birthright [36:19] Israel's goal is to inspire and empower [36:22] a new generation of Jewish young adults. [36:24] To help make that happen and to create [36:26] more life-changing experiences like [36:28] mine, please visit one tripverthing.com. [36:32] Birthright. [music] [36:33] One trip changes everything. [36:39] Ever listen to Call Me Back and think to [36:41] yourself, this would be so much better [36:42] if a me went on a rant about the latest [36:44] celebrity who said something stupid [36:46] about Israel. Or if Nadav ranked every [36:48] member of Knesset by how hot they are. [36:50] Tune in to our show, Chosen People [36:52] Problems for the Real News. [36:53] >> Yeah, because that's what the world [36:55] needs. More Jews in media. [36:57] >> Yeah, like more Jews with strong [36:58] opinions about things. [37:00] >> I think we should do it one more time. I [37:01] don't want to do Yeah. I can't. You [37:03] could say it. I just don't want to say [37:04] it. [37:05] >> What did I say? [37:06] >> We both did. Yeah. Like we're not Why [37:08] are we doing that? It sounds so [37:10] Sorry for those listening and [37:12] editing this. [37:13] >> It's going to get worse from here. By [37:14] the way, listen to our show, Chosen [37:17] People Problems. This should actually be [37:19] the intro. Okay. Chosen People Problems. [37:23] We're like a meat and a dove, but more [37:25] so. Please tune in or dancing will be [37:27] mad at us. You can find Chosen People [37:30] Problems wherever you get your podcasts. [37:32] You can also listen adree and get access [37:34] to our weekly exclusive bonus episode by [37:36] joining ARC Plus at arcdia.org. [37:40] And we're back with Mark Dubowitz, CEO [37:42] of the Foundation for Defense of [37:44] Democracies, and Suzanne Maloney, vice [37:46] president and director of the foreign [37:48] policy program at Brookings. Uh, a [37:50] question for both of you. I I mean, I'm [37:52] in Israel right now. There's [37:53] increasingly talk, chat, reports about [37:56] the possibility of Israel striking Iran [37:59] in the next few weeks, even possibly [38:00] before the election here in Israel. What [38:03] I mean, it's all speculative right now. [38:05] I'm just curious what what your [38:07] assessment of that possibility is. So, [38:08] I'll start with you, Suzanne. [38:10] >> I would defer to Mark on this one. I'm [38:11] not in Israel at the moment, and I I [38:13] don't really have a a sense of the [38:15] zeitgeist there. So, I I did just want [38:17] to say a word though about the China [38:19] factor, which I find quite strange. Um, [38:22] sure. [38:22] >> I there there's no world in which [38:25] somehow this war has put us in a [38:27] stronger position visav China. The war [38:30] has amplified doubts among all of our [38:32] friends and allies about the value of [38:33] our security umbrella. Our allies see an [38:36] America that's been humiliated. Our Gulf [38:39] partners now believe that their survival [38:41] requires integrating Iran into the [38:43] regional system in some way. And there's [38:46] simply no world in which we are in a [38:49] better position having significantly [38:51] degraded our munitions and interceptors [38:54] through this war to deal with a Taiwan [38:56] contingency in the in the near or even [38:59] medium-term future. We have set [39:01] ourselves back and we have demonstrated [39:03] to the Chinese that they can in fact [39:06] withstand the crisis that most assumed [39:08] they were far more vulnerable to than [39:11] the United States because they are so [39:13] heavily reliant on imports of oil from [39:16] the Persian Gulf region. And now they [39:19] have demonstrated their ability both [39:21] through their strategic petroleum [39:23] reserves but also through the [39:24] electrification of their economy that [39:27] they can withstand crises that impose a [39:30] high cost on the United States. The [39:31] presumption that this somehow benefits [39:33] our strategic competition with China [39:36] just strikes me as ludicrous. [39:38] >> Well, Dan, let me say something to to [39:40] that. I just had actually on my podcast [39:43] the Japanese ambassador to Israel who [39:45] also previously served as a director [39:47] general of the intelligence division of [39:48] the ministry of foreign affairs of Japan [39:51] was exactly he was making this argument [39:53] that I just made which is really [39:54] fascinating. He thinks that by by [39:57] sharply reducing the possibility of a [40:00] another front against Iran, [40:03] we can therefore focus our resources on [40:07] a a the coming front in the Indoacific [40:10] with respect to China. So I I encourage [40:12] folks to listen to that podcast. I think [40:14] he makes the argument better than I am. [40:16] But let me respond to your question [40:17] about the October surprise. I mean, I I' [40:19] I've warned in pages of the New York [40:21] Post now for a couple months that there [40:22] would be an October surprise and we [40:24] needed to look out for it, but that [40:25] October surprise would be the one the [40:27] Iranians would be launching, not the [40:29] United States or Israel. And so you the [40:32] attacks against Saudi Arabia, you could [40:33] argue, are part of an October surprise. [40:36] What the Houthies are doing in the Red [40:37] Sea is an Iranianbacked effort again to [40:40] spike oil prices and diminish President [40:42] Trump's chances at the ballot box. As [40:44] Suzanne said, that could be the October [40:47] surprise. Is it in Netanyahu's interest [40:50] to launch an October surprise against [40:52] the Iranians? And if he does, you had [40:54] asked earlier, what does that look like? [40:56] I think the Israelis believe that [40:59] targeting energy infrastructure going [41:02] after the next 20, 30, 50, 70 members of [41:05] the Iranian regime, they've got a very [41:07] rich and deep target bank that they're [41:09] eager to use. Um, but the real question [41:12] again is, is President Trump willing to [41:14] greenlight an Israeli strike right [41:17] before the November midterms? And I'm [41:19] I'm skeptical that he would. [41:21] >> Okay. I guess I want to end with a [41:22] question for each of you. And I you know [41:26] and you you can you can amend my [41:28] scenario but let's imagine the war as we [41:31] understand it this phase of the war that [41:34] the war ends with the Islamic Republic [41:36] still in power for the foreseeable [41:39] future but a severely weakened military [41:44] the regime the Islamic regime is still [41:46] in power but it has a severely weakened [41:48] military and a nuclear program that has [41:51] been severely damaged maybe contained [41:53] for some time, but not permanently [41:56] dismantled. And imagine that Hormuz [41:59] reopens and sanctions are partially [42:02] lifted and Iran agrees to some [42:06] restrictions on its nuclear program [42:08] going forward, however, you know, [42:10] verifiable those are. Is that an [42:12] American victory? Would that be an [42:14] outcome that that both of you could say, [42:16] you know, we we've gotten the situation, [42:18] at least for the time being, to a [42:20] satisfactory place? I'll I'll start with [42:22] you, Suzanne. [42:24] I think that that would be a positive [42:26] outcome as compared to where we are [42:27] today and where we have been over the [42:29] course of this war the past seven [42:31] months. I don't describe it as a [42:33] victory. I don't think that the price [42:35] that we have paid is worth what that [42:38] modest um setback to Iran's military [42:41] power and some kind of an agreement that [42:45] probably won't be any more um durable [42:48] than the JCPOA pro proved to be. So, you [42:52] know, I think that an end to this war is [42:55] is going to have to be negotiated [42:58] diplomatically. It's not going to be [42:59] achieved through military force. It will [43:02] leave the Islamic Republic in power. It [43:05] will leave the Iranian people far worse [43:07] off than they were even before this war [43:09] began. And it will leave the United [43:12] States, I think, in a position where we [43:13] have had to concede to an adversary that [43:17] seems economically, technologically [43:20] inferior to the United States. And that, [43:23] as we've seen in other conflicts, is [43:25] fundamentally conceding a victory to the [43:28] Islamic Republic. They have uh done so [43:30] in other cases. They will use this to [43:33] and any opening they get in terms of uh [43:36] sanctions relief as a way to consolidate [43:38] the regime once again to reinforce their [43:41] ideological narrative and to proclaim a [43:44] great victory over the great Satan. It [43:47] would be a tragedy. Uh Suzanne, before I [43:50] I let Mark respond to my scenario, I [43:52] just have one question because when Epic [43:54] Fury got going with a lot of shock and [43:57] awe, and then it it seemed to kind of [44:01] stall, there was this chorus, and I [44:04] alluded to this earlier. There was this [44:06] growing chorus that was like, "Oh, the [44:08] Trump administration is being squeezed [44:10] because Iran's leaders, the regime's [44:12] leaders understand that the closer and [44:14] closer we get to the midterms, the [44:16] congressional midterms in the United [44:17] States, it's going to be impossible for [44:20] Trump to do anything but just make major [44:23] concessions." [44:25] And the reality is he hasn't, right? I [44:29] mean he he at least the concessions that [44:31] were being speculated that he would that [44:33] many thought he would make he has not [44:35] made and he has basically maintained [44:38] some kind of squeeze on Iran on the [44:40] regime and kind of gotten creative. I I [44:42] take your point at the expense of the [44:45] deployment of a lot of military [44:46] resources but but the administration has [44:48] gotten pretty creative about how to keep [44:51] energy supplies energy resources flowing [44:54] more or less. First of all, are you [44:56] surprised that the administration didn't [44:58] fold as quickly as many had had [45:00] predicted he would? And do you think the [45:03] regime miscalculated in that in that [45:06] assumption? Assuming they were making [45:08] that assumption because many of us many [45:09] out there thought the regime was [45:11] assuming the closer and closer the the [45:14] US got to midterm elections that [45:16] President Trump was like up against the [45:17] wall. [45:18] >> Look, the president did make major [45:19] concessions with theou that he signed [45:21] back in June. Um the Iranians obviously [45:24] didn't trust them, nor should they have [45:25] um simply because it was far too [45:27] generous an arrangement. It was almost [45:29] surreal. Um they I think underestimated [45:32] the ability of the US military to manage [45:35] this really complicated situation in the [45:38] strait. The Iranian regime [45:40] underestimated, [45:41] >> absolutely underestimated how quickly [45:43] and how successfully the United States [45:45] could actually um deploy enough force [45:48] and go through these creative ship-to- [45:51] ship transfers that the Iranians [45:52] themselves have utilized as as a kind of [45:55] tool of their smuggling operation over [45:56] the course of the past eight years. um [45:59] and that that would that would resupply [46:02] the uh global economy obviously at a [46:04] very very high cost not just in terms of [46:06] US military presence in the region but [46:08] also in terms of the premium uh of $30 a [46:11] barrel or more that's being paid by the [46:13] companies the countries and consumers uh [46:16] as a result of these arrangements but I [46:18] think they underestimated that. I don't [46:20] know that they're playing this for the [46:22] midterms. The Iranian regime has um a [46:25] lot of antipathy toward both parties. [46:27] They haven't necessarily found either [46:29] one of them to be terribly amendable to [46:31] their ambitions and ideological [46:34] strictctures. So I I I don't think that [46:36] they're quite as focused on midterms as [46:38] they are on trying to create a new [46:40] strategic equation in the region. They [46:42] want to maintain some kind of [46:44] sovereignty over the the straight of [46:46] Hormuz. They want to ensure that they [46:48] get real economic benefits as a result [46:51] of their ability to withstand this war [46:53] either from tolling the strait or from [46:56] some new economic arrangement with the [46:58] Gulf or sanctions relief or some [47:00] combination of the three. And so it is [47:02] that determination on their part to try [47:04] to change the the the balance of power [47:07] permanently. And they have done that in [47:09] some respects because they've made some [47:11] of our bases nearly uninhabitable. our [47:13] military posture in the region is going [47:15] to have to be significantly adjusted for [47:18] the long term as a result of this war. [47:20] And we don't even know what that looks [47:21] like at this point in time. But I do [47:23] think that, you know, when we look back [47:26] on this period, it's very possible that [47:28] the Iranians have um overreach. They've [47:30] done that in the past. They did that [47:32] during the Iran Iraq war when they [47:33] rejected an offer of reparations to end [47:36] the war. that coming from the Gulf at [47:38] the time. They may have overreached at [47:40] this point in time, but my guess is that [47:43] they're going to continue to try to [47:45] calibrate both escalation and diplomacy [47:47] in a way that keeps the regime in power, [47:49] that enables them to net some benefits, [47:51] and that will be a strategic setback for [47:53] Washington. [47:54] >> I was a critic of theou, but I I am I've [47:58] been confident in President Trump's [48:00] throughine on Iran policy since the [48:03] first Trump administration. And I think [48:04] President Trump understands the danger [48:06] of the Islamic Republic. He understands [48:07] that for 47 years, [48:10] US presidents on both sides of the aisle [48:12] did not confront the war that had been [48:13] launched against the United States by [48:15] this Islamist regime. And he understood [48:18] that it was his responsibility to [48:20] severely diminish their deadly [48:23] capabilities. And I think that he has [48:25] done so. And so if that scenario that [48:27] you painted, Dan, ends up I think that [48:29] is a victory for the United States. Now [48:30] clearly that's not a total victory. A [48:33] total victory is the end of the regime [48:35] and a replacement with someone something [48:37] better for the Iranian people and better [48:40] for the region and better for America. [48:42] But to severely degrade their deadly [48:44] capabilities, nuclear, missile, and [48:47] military and terror capabilities over a [48:49] short period of time is a real victory. [48:51] And again, I just want to I want to [48:53] return back to this because I think it's [48:55] always important in national security [48:56] and foreign policy and life. You got to [48:58] compare where you are to where you could [49:00] have been. Compared to where we were [49:01] when President Trump took office last [49:03] year. Compared to where we would have [49:05] been if we had stayed in the JCPOA and [49:08] allowed the JCPOA to give Iran these [49:10] patient pathways to nuclear weapons. The [49:12] scenario that you just painted is [49:14] significantly better. Is it total [49:16] victory? No. Is it is it victory? Well, [49:20] maybe it's limited victory. And what [49:21] really matters is the next president. [49:23] And I'd like to think the Iranians are [49:25] right and that it doesn't matter if it's [49:27] a Democrat in the White House or [49:28] Republican in the White House, and that [49:30] the next president, regardless of party, [49:32] is going to continue to put the pressure [49:33] on this regime, not allow it to [49:35] reconstitute its nuclear, missile, and [49:37] terror capabilities. And yes, I' I've [49:39] always been in support of diplomacy and [49:41] drive the Iranians to a hard bargain, [49:43] but not a bargain that allows them to [49:45] retain these deadly nuclear capabilities [49:47] that one day they can turn into nuclear [49:49] weapons. This war uh is probably going [49:52] to continue in one form or another [49:54] through the entirety of the Trump [49:56] administration. So, I have a feeling [49:58] I'll be checking back in with both of [50:00] you uh to give us your scorecard as we [50:03] go along. Suzanne, Mark, thank you for [50:06] this conversation. [50:07] >> Thank you, Dan. [50:08] >> Thank you. [music] [50:17] Here in the US, Jewish college students [50:20] have been carrying their own weight. For [50:22] years now, they have faced peer pressure [50:23] and a constant stream of anti-Israel [50:26] misinformation on campus, online, and [50:29] everywhere they turn. 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